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Article

Public Enforcement Compensation and
Private Rights
†

Prentiss Cox

INTRODUCTION
On July 18, 2012, the newly created United States Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) settled its first en1
forcement action. The CFPB alleged that Capital One Bank
targeted subprime credit card holders with solicitations for
credit monitoring services, falsely stated these services were
2
free, and misrepresented the benefits. The settlement required
the bank to provide account credits to card holders for the full
cost of the services plus amounts incurred for interest and bank
fees, resulting in estimated total consumer refunds of $140 mil3
lion. The settlement also required the bank to comply with a
plan to reform its marketing practices and pay a $25 million
4
penalty. The agency followed its action against Capital One
with a series of similar cases involving “add-on” charges by
5
credit card issuers, which are part of over $11.2 billion in re† Associate Professor of Law, Co-Director of Law in Practice, University
of Minnesota Law School. The author thanks the following individuals for advice and helpful criticism: Mark Totten, Jim Tierney, Steve Houck, Kevin
O’Connor, Lesley Fair, Katie Porter, Patrick Madigan, Jill Hasday, Allan
Erbsen, Dan Schwarcz, Kaitlin Caruso, Jonathon Reischl, Amy Widman, Eric
Halperin, Adam Zimmerman, Adam Levitin, Dee Pridgen, Urska Velikonja,
and Stephanie Enerson. Copyright © 2016 by Prentiss Cox.
1. Press Release, CFPB, CFPB Probe into Capital One Credit Card Marketing Results in $140 Million Consumer Refund (July 18, 2012), http://www
.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-capital-one-probe.
2. Stipulation and Consent Order, In re Capital One Bank (USA) N.A.,
CFPB No. 2012-CFPB-0001, at 3–8 (July 18, 2012) [hereinafter Capital One
Consent Order].
3. Id. at 13–20; Press Release, CFPB, supra note 1.
4. Capital One Consent Order, supra note 2, at 8–13, 21–23 (discussing
compliance requirements), 20–21 (discussing civil penalty).
5. Press Release, CFPB, Prepared Remarks of CFPB Director Richard
Cordray on the Bank of America Enforcement Action Press Call (Apr. 9, 2014),
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funds or other relief to 25.5 million consumers through CFPB
6
enforcement actions during its first years of existence.
A nascent scholarly view is emerging that recipients of
public enforcement compensation should be given the procedural protections afforded to class members in class action cas7
es. For the CFPB action against Capital One, this would have
meant submitting the settlement agreement to judicial review,
sending notices to credit card holders whose accounts were
charged by the bank, and providing these consumers with an
opportunity to accept or opt out of the refund, rather than the
CFPB simply arranging for automatic account credits. Over the
last fifteen years, state attorneys general have brought several
similar enforcement actions alleging deception in charges add8
ed to credit card or other consumer accounts. As part of this
new scholarship critiquing public compensation, a 2012 article
in the Harvard Law Review by Margaret Lemos suggests that
consumer payments like those that occurred in these state en9
forcement cases raise constitutional Due Process concerns.
The new scholarship on public enforcement compensation
is wrong in analysis and prescription. This Article presents an
alternative framework for understanding the relationship between public compensation and the private rights of recipients
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/prepared-remarks-of-cfpb-director
-richard-cordray-on-the-bank-of-america-enforcement-action-press-call
(announcing settlement with $727 million in consumer refunds and noting the
case was CFPB’s fifth enforcement action related to credit card add-on products).
6. CFPB, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU: BY THE NUMBERS
(Oct. 2015), http://cdn.thinkprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/101651
06/2015-10-26-CFPB-By-the-Numbers.pdf.
7. See Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486, 491–92 (2012);
Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Agency Class Action,
112 COLUM. L. REV. 1992, 1999–2002 (2012); Adam S. Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500, 504–07 (2011); see also Seth Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 45 (2014) (discussing
“substitute suits” that provide monetary relief). This Article uses the term
“public enforcement compensation,” or “public compensation” for ease of reference, to mean an order or agreement resulting from a public civil enforcement
action that creates an obligation by the defendant to compensate a numerous
group of people.
8. See Prentiss Cox, The Invisible Hand of Preacquired Account Marketing, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 425, 439–40 (2010) (describing enforcement actions
by state attorneys general); see also State ex rel. Miller v. Vertrue, Inc., 834
N.W.2d 12, 33 (Iowa 2013) (awarding approximately $36 million in restitution
to Iowa consumers for charges to their credit cards and bank accounts).
9. Lemos, supra note 7, at 531–42.
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of that compensation. Public compensation is defined by two
realities: first, government enforcers obtain public compensation under different forms of statutory authority in various
regulatory fields; second, it is a discretionary remedy in public
civil law enforcement. Because public compensation occurs under various statutory authorities in a multitude of enforcement
areas, the relationship between public compensation and private rights has to be understood contextually. Calls for sweeping procedural reforms make little sense without attention to
these differing legal and enforcement environments. Because
public compensation is a discretionary remedial option, it presents no substantially different issues regarding conflicts between public enforcement and private rights than the myriad
other choices made by public officials in selecting and prosecuting targets within their authority.
The billions of dollars in public compensation already distributed to consumers in the short life of the CFPB parallels
billions in public compensation obtained by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), state attorneys general, and other government entities
active in civil law enforcement. Payment to consumers, investors, and employees has been part of government civil law enforcement for decades, but the frequency and dollar amounts of
10
these cases have risen sharply. As class actions recede under
11
judicial and legislative pressure, the burgeoning scholarship
on public compensation lays the groundwork for limits on this
remedy.
This Article offers four contributions to the emerging
scholarship on public compensation. First, it maps the existing
law and practice in public compensation cases, which has occurred only in bits and pieces in prior work. Knowledge of the
legal authority granted byand constraints imposed
byvarying statutory schemes is a critical and usually overlooked starting point for understanding public compensation.
Second, the Article identifies an error in the prior scholarship on the central issue of the preclusive effect of public compensation on subsequent private claims for monetary relief.
Lemos is wrong in asserting that the “prevailing view” of courts
10. See infra note 200.
11. See Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation
in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 658–60
(2012) (concluding that “[c]lass actions are on the ropes,” resulting in an “enforcement gap”).
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is that public compensation results in preclusion of later pri12
vate claims for monetary relief. Accordingly, concerns about
constitutional deprivations arising from public compensation
are misplaced. Her erroneous assertion about preclusion rests
on a failure to differentiate the various statutory schemes under which government enforcers obtain public compensation. It
also reflects a mistaken premise that public compensation is a
government form of class action litigation.
The notion that public compensation and class actions are
functional equivalents is employed in the new scholarship to
argue that the imposition of class action procedures in public
compensation would better protect the interests of the relief recipients. The third contribution of this Article is to explore and
reject the usefulness of this analogy for understanding and
structuring public compensation. This analogy has roots in
largely unsuccessful arguments by enforcement defendants in a
13
variety of contexts. Indeed, corporate defendants have cited
the new scholarship in recent challenges to government en14
forcement actions seeking public compensation. The decision
by a government enforcer to pursue public compensation does
not diminish the public nature of the enforcement action and
does not convert public officials into representatives of private
interests. Public and private enforcement can overlap in purpose and consequence, but a focus on similarities distracts from
the fundamentally distinct nature of public versus private enforcement.
Fourth, the Article identifies two categories of public compensation cases which can result in a practical, meaningful loss
of private rights. The Article presents proposals for law reform
to better align public purpose and private rights in these two
types of cases.
The Article proceeds roughly in alignment with these four
contributions. Part I is an overview of the government enforcement entities that obtain public compensation in four discrete
areas of market regulation and the varying statutory schemes
that provide authority for this remedy. Part II summarizes the
scholarship arguing that public compensation should operate
under stricter procedural constraints because it achieves the
same result as a class action and purportedly raises similar
problems of accountability and consent, yet lacks the rigorous
12. For Lemos’s assertion, see Lemos, supra note 7, at 500.
13. See infra Part IV.B.3.
14. See infra note 225.
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procedural protections governing class actions. Part III demonstrates that public compensation is not preclusive of later private claims and examines how the mistaken premises in the existing scholarship appear to have influenced the error in the
Lemos article. Part IV broadens the discussion to look at the
distortions in understanding public compensation caused by
scholarly reliance on the analogy between public compensation
and class action cases. Part V narrows the discussion to focus
on practical conflicts that occur between public compensation
15
and private rights, and means of avoiding these conflicts.
I. THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF PUBLIC COMPENSATION
This Part explicates the types of government enforcement
actions that result in public compensation and the legal authority for this remedy.
A. REGULATORY AREAS OF PUBLIC COMPENSATION
Government enforcers regularly obtaining public compensation can be categorized by the markets or conduct over which
the entity has regulatory authority. Public compensation tends
to follow distinct patterns in the following four areas: consumer
16
protection, antitrust, securities, and employment. A brief survey of each of these areas follows.
1. Consumer Protection
The longest-standing routine use of public compensation is
found in consumer protection cases brought by the FTC and
17
state attorneys general. These entities bring actions in a
15. “Private rights” in this Article refers to the rights of recipients, including potential recipients, of public compensation, and not the rights of enforcement defendants, which would open an entirely different set of issues.
16. The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) has enforcement authority in each of the four regulatory areas. It has authority to pursue public
compensation in civil law enforcement for employees under various employment discrimination laws, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (2012); Michael Waterstone,
A New Vision of Public Enforcement, 92 MINN. L. REV. 434, 461–78 (2007), for
tenants and homeowners subject to discrimination under the Fair Housing
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3614(d)(1)(B) (2012), and for consumer financial protection of
active duty military members under the Servicemembers’ Civil Relief Act, 50
U.S.C. app. § 597 (2012). The DOJ also plays a critical role in antitrust enforcement, although it lacks authority to pursue public compensation in such
cases. Patricia A. Conners, Current Trends and Issues in State Antitrust Enforcement, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 37, 55 (2003).
17. See Stephen Calkins, An Enforcement Official’s Reflections on Antitrust Class Actions, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 413, 432 (1997) (noting that the FTC has
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broad array of industries employing their authority to pursue
violations of unfair and deceptive acts and practices (UDAP)
18
laws. In 2013, the FTC obtained $297 million in public com19
pensation in its UDAP cases. The FTC and state attorneys
general have used their UDAP authority to challenge fraudulent practices in entire market segments, but they also bring a
20
variety of modest-sized cases against individual companies.
While the FTC and state attorneys general have broad
marketplace purview, a segment of federal and state regulators
seek public compensation for deceptive practices and other law
violations involving consumer financial products. Federal banking regulators that regularly obtain public compensation are
the CFPB, the Office of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and
21
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Banking
regulators order public compensation incident to their supervision examinations or seek it in enforcement actions resulting
from investigations of suspected problems. In 2012, for example, the FDIC alleged an affiliate of Bancorp Bank was illegally
“charging student account holders multiple nonsufficient fund
made “widespread use” of public compensation since the 1980s); John W.
Wade & Robert D. Kamenshine, Restitution for Defrauded Consumers: Making
the Remedy Effective Through Suit by Governmental Agency, 37 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1031, 1057–65 (1969) (describing the early use of public compensation by
the FTC and state attorneys general).
18. JONATHON SHELDON ET AL., NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FEDERAL
DECEPTION LAW § 1.5 (2d ed. 2016); see Lesley Fair, Federal Trade Commission Advertising Enforcement, FTC 6–10 (Mar. 1, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/files/attachments/training-materials/enforcement.pdf (collecting
cases in which the FTC has obtained monetary remedies for consumers).
19. FTC, STATS AND DATA 2013 (Jan.–Dec. 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/attachments/stats-data-2013/statsdata2013.pdf.
20. State attorneys general, for example, used UDAP law to lead public
enforcement efforts against subprime mortgage lenders both before and after
the mortgage market collapse that led to the financial crisis. See Mark Totten,
The Enforcers & the Great Recession, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1611 (2015). An example of a routine UDAP enforcement resulting in public compensation is a
joint case brought by the FTC and the Florida Attorney General in which owners of timeshare interests in real estate received $16.9 million in restitution of
fees paid to a company falsely claiming to have buyers ready to purchase their
timeshare interests. Judgment and Final Order, FTC v. Info. Mgmt. Forum,
Inc., No. 6:12-cv-00986-JA-KRS, at 8 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2013).
21. The OCC and FDIC are “prudential” banking regulators charged primarily with ensuring the safety and soundness of their regulated financial institutions. Adam J. Levitin, The Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation of Financial Politics: A Review Essay, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1991, 2018,
2043 (2014); see also Catherine M. Sharkey, Agency Coordination in Consumer
Protection, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 329, 331 (describing overlapping UDAP authority of FTC, state regulators and federal banking regulators).
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(NSF) fees from a single merchant transaction” and other conduct related to NSF fees, including taking funds typically used
22
to cover tuition expenses to pay the improper NSF charges.
The FDIC obtained a Consent Order with extensive requirements for operational changes, a civil penalty of $172,000 for
Bankcorp Bank and $110,000 for its affiliate, and restitution
estimated at $11 million, which was provided by the bank directly to account holders as credits for the full amount of the
23
overcharges. State financial regulators also obtain public
compensation for consumers in the banking, insurance, and re24
al estate sectors.
2. Antitrust
The FTC obtains public compensation in civil antitrust
cases, although it historically has been more cautious in seeking public compensation in antitrust cases than in UDAP cas25
es. State attorneys general play a substantial role in public
compensation in antitrust, with authority under both federal
26
and state law to seek relief for consumers. States commonly
bring antitrust enforcement actions cooperatively in a single

22. Press Release, FDIC, FDIC Announces Settlements with Higher One,
Inc., New Haven, Connecticut, and the Bancorp Bank, Wilmington, Delaware
for Unfair and Deceptive Practices (Aug. 8, 2012), https://www.fdic.gov/news/
news/press/2012/pr12092.html.
23. Id.
24. States have parallel authority to federal regulators in banking and
primary authority over insurance and real estate transactions. See, e.g., Review of the National Bank Preemption Rules: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 132–40 (2004) (statement of
Gavin M. Gee, Director of Finance, State of Idaho, on behalf of the Conference
of State Bank Supervisors) (describing the dual banking system and listing
examples of restitution in enforcement actions by numerous state banking
commissioners); Theodore Allegaert, Comment, Derivative Actions by Policyholders on Behalf of Mutual Insurance Companies, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1063,
1069–70 (1996) (noting that “[s]tates regulate insurance more than almost any
other industry, due in part to a near total absence of federal insurance regulation” and “[f]ines and restitution” are common remedies obtained by state insurance commissioners).
25. D. Bruce Hoffman, To Certify or Not: A Modest Proposal for Evaluating the “Superiority” of a Class Action in the Presence of Government Enforcement, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1383, 1387 (2005). In 2003, the FTC issued a
policy statement limiting the circumstances under which it would seek public
compensation, but the FTC withdrew the policy in 2012 because it created “an
overly restrictive view of the Commission’s options for equitable remedies.”
Withdrawal of the Commission Policy Statement on Monetary Equitable Remedies in Competition Cases, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,070 (Aug. 7, 2012).
26. See infra Part I.B.4.
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27

action known as a “multistate” case. State antitrust enforce28
ment raises unique issues in public compensation.
29
In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litigation, a suit
jointly filed by the FTC and ten state attorneys general against
a drug manufacturer, provides an apt example of public compensation in the antitrust context. The FTC and the states alleged that four manufacturers conspired to monopolize the
market for generic anti-anxiety medications, allegedly raising
30
the price nineteen-fold. The settlement of the suit resulted in
over $71 million in public compensation, with more than
244,000 claims filed by consumers who were expected to obtain
full compensation for overpayment on the price of these medi31
cations.
3. Securities
Investors receive public compensation from the enforcement actions of the SEC. The SEC obtains disgorgement of illegal gains and can, in its discretion, seek distribution of these
32
funds to investors. The SEC also can use civil penalties to
provide investor restitution through the “Fair Funds” program
created by Congress in the wake of corporate accounting scan33
dals. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
and state securities regulators also distribute public compensa34
tion to investors.
27. Conners, supra note 16, at 37 (describing the development and organization of multistate antitrust cases); Harry First, Delivering Remedies: The
Role of the States in Antitrust Enforcement, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1004, 1021
(2001) (describing multistate antitrust attorney general enforcement actions).
28. See infra Part I.B.4.
29. 205 F.R.D. 369 (D.D.C. 2002).
30. Id. at 373; Spencer Weber Waller, The Incoherence of Punishment in
Antitrust, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 207, 226–27 (2003) (describing the suits
against the drug manufacturer, including allegation of price rise from antitrust conduct, and settlement arrangements).
31. In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 205 F.R.D. at 376, 377
n.14.
32. Verity Winship, Public Agencies and Investor Compensation: Examples from the SEC and CFTC, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 137, 145–46 (2009).
33. Id. at 138; see Fair Funds for Investors, 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a) (2012).
34. The Role of State Securities Regulators in Protecting Investors: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 10–
11 (2004) (statement of Joseph P. Borg, Director, Alabama Securities Commission; Chairman, Enforcement Section of the North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc.) (citing survey of state securities regulators finding over $660 million in “restitution, rescission and disgorgement” in 2002 and
2003). The CFTC usually arranges for investor compensation in a role akin to
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An exhaustive 2014 study of SEC public compensation cases from 2002 to 2013 found that SEC ordered more than $14
35
billion in public compensation. The study also found that public compensation focused on different types of securities law
36
violations than private securities class action cases. Partly
due to statutory reforms that limit private securities class actions, public compensation constitutes the only form of monetary relief for investors in more than half of cases in which the
37
SEC obtains such relief.
4. Employment
Employees receive public compensation from the Equal
38
Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC). EEOC public compensation is obtained through “pattern and practice”
cases that challenge systemic employment discrimination prac39
tices. The EEOC can also seek relief for individual employees
40
in addition to the aggregate relief of concern here. An example
of an EEOC public compensation case is a 2009 settlement following litigation against Outback Steakhouse for employment
conditions that limited the promotion of women to senior man41
agement positions. The settlement resulted in a $19 million
fund that identified two categories of women who had the opportunity to file a claim and obtain relief as determined by a

arbitrator rather than through public compensation, Winship, supra note 32,
at 147–52, but it also obtains public compensation in certain enforcement actions. See, e.g., U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Hunter Wise
Commodities, LLC, No. 12-81311-cv, 2014 WL 4050008, at *2–3 (S.D. Fla. May
16, 2014) (awarding over $52 million in restitution to be distributed at the discretion of the court-appointed monitor); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n
v. Milton, No. 10-80738-cv, 2013 WL 2158428, at *6 (S.D. Fla. May 17, 2013)
(awarding “restitution to all defrauded customers”).
35. Urska Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence
from the SEC’s Fair Fund Distributions, 67 STAN. L. REV. 331, 332–33 (2015).
36. See id. at 391 (“[SEC] distributions . . . dwarf class action recoveries
except in accounting fraud cases.”).
37. Id. at 369–71.
38. Angela D. Morrison, Duke-ing Out Pattern or Practice After Wal-Mart:
The EEOC as Fist, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 87, 120–24 (2013).
39. See id. at 93.
40. See id. at 121. See generally Pauline T. Kim, Addressing Systemic Discrimination: Public Enforcement and the Role of the EEOC, 95 B.U. L. REV.
1133, 1136–38 (2015) (explaining the difference between cases on behalf of an
aggrieved individual and EEOC systemic discrimination cases).
41. Consent Decree, EEOC v. Outback Steakhouse of Fla., No. 06-cv01935-CMA-KLM, 2009 WL 5177751 (D. Colo. Dec. 22, 2009).
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42

neutral or the EEOC. The settlement also included agreements by Outback to reform its employment promotion proce43
dures.
B. LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR PUBLIC COMPENSATION
Public compensation almost always is based on statutory
authority. This statutory authority, in turn, sometimes reflects
specific circumstances and history of the regulatory area in
which the government enforcer acts. Understanding public
compensation requires attention to these varying statutory
schemes and enforcement environments. Government enforcers
rely on one of three types of legal authority to obtain public
compensation: (1) statutory injunctive authority; (2) express
statutory authority; or (3) parens patriae authority. The following three subparts explain each type of legal authority, all of
which grant broad powers to, and occasionally impose restraints on, government enforcers seeking public compensation.
The fourth subpart looks at the unique character of public compensation in state antitrust enforcement.
1. Statutory Injunctive Authority
The foundational case for public compensation is Porter v.
Warner Holding Co., decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in
44
1946. The defendant in Porter was a landlord found to have
charged hundreds of tenants rent in excess of wartime price
45
controls. The Office of Price Administration (OPA) brought an
enforcement action to stop the overcharges and require restitu46
tion payments to the tenants. Lacking specific authority for
such relief, the Administrator relied on a statute authorizing
the court to grant an injunction “or other order” upon proof of a
47
violation of the law. The district court order, affirmed by the
Eighth Circuit, granted the Administrator an injunction
against further excessive rent but determined that the Administrator lacked authority to obtain restitution for the tenants
48
under this statute.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at *34–47.
Id. at *12–34.
328 U.S. 395 (1946).
Id. at 396–97.
Id. at 396.
Id. at 397.
Id.
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The Supreme Court reversed and held that “an order for
recovery and restitution of illegal rents” was a proper equitable
remedy within the meaning of the price control statute and also
within the equitable power of the court to shape remedies as
49
necessary to enforce compliance with the statute. The Court
distinguished the equitable remedy of restitution from the legal
50
right of tenants to sue for damages under the same statute.
The Administrator’s request for restitution in equity invoked
“broader and more flexible” powers of the court because it was
in the public interest, and thus “within the highest tradition of
51
a court of equity.”
Statutory authorization for injunctive relief, as used by the
Administrator in Porter, has been called a “statutory injunc52
tion.” The rationale of Porter linking public compensation to
the broad equitable powers of the court remains vital in public
compensation almost seven decades later. Many government
enforcers continue to use statutory injunctive authority for public compensation, and the FTC and the CFTC primarily rely on
53
this authority. It is often used by federal agencies who sporadically seek public compensation. HUD, for example, used this
authority to obtain an award of over $8 million for hundreds of
land purchasers for violations of the Interstate Land Sales Full
54
Disclosure Act. State attorneys general commonly rely on
statutory injunctive authority for public compensation when
55
state law does not provide express authority.

49. Id. at 398–99.
50. Id. at 401–02.
51. Id. at 398, 401–02.
52. See Daniel A. Farber, Equitable Discretion, Legal Duties, and Environmental Injunctions, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 513 (1984); Zygmunt J.B. Plater,
Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 524 (1982).
53. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Wilshire Inv. Mgmt.
Corp., 531 F.3d 1339, 1344 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding CFTC statute similar to
the statute interpreted in Porter and collecting cases allowing CFTC to use
statutory injunctive authority for restitution or disgorgement); Peter C. Ward,
Restitution for Consumers Under the Federal Trade Commission Act: Good Intentions or Congressional Intentions?, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1139, 1184–95 (1992).
54. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Cost Control Mktg. & Sales
Mgmt. of Va., Inc., 64 F.3d 920, 924 (4th Cir. 1995).
55. See CAROLYN CARTER & JONATHON SHELDON, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE
ACTS AND PRACTICES § 13.5.4.1 (8th ed. 2012) (stating that the “overwhelming
majority of courts find it within their equitable power to grant restitution as
relief even when this is not provided for in the UDAP statute”); see also State
ex rel. McGraw v. Imperial Mktg., 506 S.E.2d 799, 811–12 (W. Va. 1998).
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2. Express Statutory Authority
Most government enforcers active in seeking public compensation at both the federal and state level rely on express
56
statutory authority, in part or in whole. State attorneys general typically use express statutory authority for UDAP en57
forcement, and state financial regulators also distribute public
58
compensation under statutory schemes. Some states also expressly authorize local government enforcement entities to ob59
tain public compensation.
The statutes expressly authorizing public compensation often contain only a word or phrase providing for the entity to obtain or the court to order “restitution,” “recovery” or “restoration” of money or property, or disgorgement. The authorization
to obtain the identified remedies can appear in isolation or can
be lumped into a list of options, including reference to general
judicial equitable authority as the context for the granted power. For example, the Illinois Attorney General has authoriza60
tion to obtain “restitution” for UDAP violations, while New
Jersey authorizes a court order “of rescission, restitution or
disgorgement or any other order within the court’s power” for
61
violations of state securities law. The newest entrant to public
compensation, the recently created CFPB, obtains public compensation under authority in the Dodd-Frank Act that lists a
gamut of concepts, including most terms that can be found in
statutes expressly authorizing public compensation: “(A) rescission or reformation of contracts; (B) refund of moneys or return
of real property; (C) restitution; (D) disgorgement or compensa-

56. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2012) (EEOC); 12 U.S.C. § 5565 (2012)
(CFPB); 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(6) (2012) (FDIC and OCC). The SEC and the FTC
combine statutory injunctive and express statutory authority, as described in
this subpart.
57. CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 55, § 13.5.4.1, app. A (collecting statutes); DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE
LAW § 7:13, apps. 3A, 7A (2012) (collecting statutes); Albert Norman Shelden
& Stephen Gardner, A Truncated Overview of State Consumer Protection
Laws, C485 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 375, 386–87 (1994).
58. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-817 (2015) (Connecticut insurance
commissioner authority); MO. REV. STAT. § 409.6-603 (2015) (Missouri securities commissioner authority); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383:10-d (2016) (New
Hampshire insurance commissioner authority).
59. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (West 2016) (authorizing
suits for unfair practices by district attorneys and certain city attorneys).
60. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/7 (2016).
61. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-69 (West 2015).
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tion for unjust enrichment; (E) payment of damages or other
62
monetary relief.”
Public compensation under statutory injunctive authority
and most of the terms used in statutes expressly authorizing
public compensation are forms of equitable relief and typically
63
reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion. Consistent with
the public compensation rationale in Porter, the broad dictates
of equity are found to allow more flexible methods of proof to
obtain an award of public compensation compared to private
64
class actions. A few government enforcers, however, are au65
thorized to obtain damages.
Statutory injunctive authority and express statutory authority often overlap. The FTC has both types of authority, and
uses them alternatively depending on the type of case and en66
forcement objectives. The public compensation power of the
SEC provides an example of express statutory authority evolving out of prior reliance on statutory injunctive authority. The
62. 12 U.S.C. § 5565(g)(2) (2012).
63. See, e.g., SEC v. Contorinis, 743 F.3d 296, 301 (2d Cir. 2014); FTC v.
Wash. Data Res., Inc., 704 F.3d 1323, 1325 (11th Cir. 2013).
64. See SEC v. Razmilovic, 738 F.3d 14, 31 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134
S. Ct. 1564 (2014) (“[T]he court need not determine the amount of such [unjust] gains with exactitude.”); FTC v. Verity Int’l, Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 69 (2d Cir.
2006) (restitution is based on “reasonably approximated” unjust gains of defendants); Christopher J. Willis & Stefanie H. Jackman, What Is an Attorney
General’s Burden of Proof? (Mar. 8, 2010) (UDAP Litigation Against Financial
Institutions conference paper), http://media.straffordpub.com/products/udap
-litigation-against-financial-institutions-merging-theories-and-the-foreclosure
-documentation-crisis-2010-11-30/reference-material.pdf (categorizing states
by strictness of proof required for UDAP public compensation and observing
that “the vast majority” of states allow for relaxed proof standards for restitution); infra note 78 and accompanying text (flexible proof allowed in state antitrust actions under Clayton Act). But see Donald R. Livingston, EEOC Pattern
or Practice Litigation (Mar. 23–27, 2010) (ABA National Conference on EEO
Law conference paper) (collecting cases showing a split among courts as to
precision of proof in EEOC pattern and practice cases).
65. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5565(a)(2) (2012) (authorizing damages in CFPB
enforcement actions). The DOJ obtains injunctive relief and “such other relief
as the court deems appropriate, including monetary damages to persons aggrieved” in enforcing the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3614(d)(1)(B) (2012),
and Servicemembers’ Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 597 (2012).
66. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 53(b), 57b(b) (2012); PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra
note 57, § 7:13 (explaining that an agency may base an action on either the
express or the implied authority of the applicable statute); Ward, supra note
53 (tracing the history of two sources of authority); see also Washington Data
Res., 704 F.3d at 1326 (explaining the two sources of authority FTC uses to
obtain public compensation and affirming an award under statutory injunctive
power).
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SEC began to seek disgorgement of illegal profits under its
statutory injunctive powers in the 1970s, although it only later
67
distributed these funds to investors. In 1990, Congress recognized the agency’s use of public compensation and authorized it
68
to promulgate rules for the distribution of these funds. Congress then created the Federal Account for Investor Restitution
69
(FAIR) Funds authority, which permits distribution to investors of civil penalties levied by the SEC against the defendant,
70
along with disgorged funds from the same enforcement action.
Some statutory schemes authorize multiple government
enforcers to obtain public compensation. For instance, state attorneys general have power parallel with federal agencies to
enforce numerous federal consumer protection laws and obtain
public compensation, although states infrequently use most of
71
this federal authority.
Very few of these statutes impose procedural requirements
on the use of public compensation authority. The most prominent are in the Clayton Act’s authorization for state recovery of
72
antitrust damages. In addition, the SEC has adopted rules
prescribing some procedures to guide its public compensation.
SEC staff are required to develop a public plan for the distribution, which must include the proposed process for notice to and
claims by investors, and provide a right for investors to com73
ment on the plan. A few state attorneys general are permitted
to seek public compensation through class certification in
74
UDAP and antitrust cases. The EEOC and some state attor67. Barbara Black, Should the SEC Be a Collection Agency for Defrauded
Investors?, 63 BUS. LAW. 317, 320–22 (2008).
68. Id. at 323–24.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a) (2012).
70. Black, supra note 67, at 323–27 (tracing history of SEC “Fair Funds”
authority).
71. Amy Widman & Prentiss Cox, State Attorneys General’s Use of Concurrent Public Enforcement Authority in Federal Consumer Protection Laws,
33 CARDOZO L. REV. 53, 80 (2011) (finding 104 cases raising 120 claims under
16 federal statutes authorizing state enforcement, but with 2 telemarketing
statutes accounting for 91 of the 120 claims, with sparse use of all the remaining federal authority).
72. See infra Part I.B.4.
73. 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.1101–.1106 (2014). Investors do not have the right to
intervene in the SEC proceeding. Id. § 201.1106.
74. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.910 (2012) (permitted to proceed by
class); Hawaii ex rel. Louie v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., 761 F.3d 1027, 1039–40
(9th Cir. 2014) (noting that there is conflicting statutory authority as to
whether the state attorney general is required to bring UDAP and antitrust
actions under class action authority); In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Anti-
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neys general must follow pre-complaint restrictions on suit that
require notice to and engagement with the employer prior to
suit, but public compensation distribution procedures are on a
75
case-by-case basis.
3. Parens Patriae Authority
Commentators have focused a great deal of attention on
the third type of legal authority used in public compensation
cases—parens patriae—even though this doctrine in its traditional form is used sparingly as authority for public compensation. Scholars and courts agree that the parens doctrine is
76
“murky.” Parens allows a state to bring suit when it has “quasi-sovereign” interests in the enforcement of its civil or criminal
laws. A key limitation on a parens action is that the state suit
cannot represent solely private interests. As the Supreme
Court stated in the seminal modern case explicating the parens
doctrine, Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, the state’s quasisovereign interests cannot be “private interests pursued by the
77
State as a nominal party.”
Much of the focus on parens authority arose from the highly publicized litigation against the tobacco industry by state attorneys general in the 1990s, and later cases brought against
other controversial industries, including gun and lead paint
78
manufacturers. None of these cases, however, involved public
compensation. Rather, the states sought to enjoin conduct and

trust Litig., 205 F.R.D. 369, 387–88 (D.D.C. 2002) (finding that eight states
properly sought antitrust indirect purchaser relief through class action rules);
Celebrezze v. Hughes, 479 N.E.2d 886, 889 (Ohio 1985) (noting that the attorney general may bring a class action but is not required to do so to obtain restitution). But see Farmers Grp., Inc. v. Lubin, 222 S.W.3d 417, 425 (Tex. 2007)
(holding that a state attorney general cannot maintain a class action in the
absence of a class representative).
75. CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 55, § 13.4.1 (state attorneys general);
Morrison, supra note 38, at 124–31 (EEOC).
76. Jack Ratliff, Parens Patriae: An Overview, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1847, 1850
(2000) (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967)). For an exhaustive history
of the parens doctrine, see Jay Himes, State Parens Patriae Authority (2004)
(prepared for Institute for Law & Economic Policy Symposium on Protecting
the Public).
77. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 602
(1982).
78. Edward Brunet, Improving Class Action Efficiency by Expanded Use
of Parens Patriae Suits and Intervention, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1919, 1921 (2000)
(state attorneys general can use flexible proof in seeking damages under federal Clayton Act).
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obtain recompense for the state treasuries rather than compen79
sation for purchasers or victims of the products.
State attorneys general actively use parens authority for
public compensation mostly in a statutorily authorized form of
the doctrine in one aspect of their antitrust enforcement, which
presents unique issues discussed in the following subpart.
Some of the federal consumer protection statutes authorizing
80
parallel state enforcement also refer to parens authority. It is
not clear that a statute including the term “parens” in authorizing public compensation restricts the authority of the government enforcer compared to other forms of express statutory au81
thority.
Government enforcers rarely rely on common law parens
82
doctrine for public compensation. Federal agencies generally
have been found to lack authority to employ parens to imply a
83
right of action or remedy. No empirical research has established how often state attorneys general use common law
parens authority for public compensation, but there is little
reason for most state attorneys general to invoke this doctrine
given their statutory authority, and it appears to be an infre-

79. Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft,
Tobacco, and the Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering in Mass Litigation,
34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 30–35 (2000); William H. Pryor, Jr., A Comparison of
Abuses and Reforms of Class Actions and Multigovernment Lawsuits, 74 TUL.
L. REV. 1885, 1901–03 (2000).
80. Compare Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1640(e) (2012) (explaining that enforcement actions for violations “may also
be brought by the appropriate State attorney general”), with Controlling the
Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing (CAN-SPAM) Act of
2003, 15 U.S.C. § 7706(f)(a) (2012) (“[T]he attorney general, official, or agency
of the State, as parens patriae, may bring a civil action on behalf of the residents of the State . . . .”). State statutes authorizing public compensation outside of antitrust occasionally incorporate a parens reference.
81. In a suit by state attorneys general against Apple, Inc. for antitrust
violations in the sale of electronic books, a court recently rejected an argument
that Due Process requires the states to proceed under class action rules. In re
Elec. Books Antitrust Litig., 14 F. Supp. 3d 525, 535–37 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). The
court noted that parens authority in this statutory context was different than
common law parens, and also held that any questions of prudential standing
by the states under the parens doctrine were unavailable when Congress statutorily authorized the parens action. Id.
82. The term “common law parens” is used here to mean a non-statutory
use of the parens doctrine. It should be noted, however, that the parens doctrine has roots in both common law and equity. See generally Himes, supra
note 76.
83. Davis, supra note 7, at 24.
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84

quent occurrence. Even when state attorneys general use the
common law parens doctrine for public compensation, it can be
85
intertwined with statutory authority.
4. The Special Case of State Antitrust Enforcement
State attorney general antitrust enforcement differs from
other areas of public compensation in its origin and its procedural regime. State antitrust and unfair competition laws gen86
erally track federal antitrust laws. Local bid-rigging conduct
and mergers of local health care providers are typical subjects
87
of local market antitrust enforcement under state law. But
state attorneys general also have an important place in national antitrust enforcement. They are the only governmental entities with the ability to seek damages, including treble damages,
88
for antitrust violations under both federal and state law.
The federal statutory authority arose out of failed attempts
by the states to use their common law parens authority to obtain damages in national antitrust cases. In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. that states
could sue for injunctive relief to restrain antitrust violations using parens authority, but that state quasi-sovereign interests
did not authorize states to seek damages for state citizens for
89
the same antitrust violations. In 1976, Congress responded by
amending the Clayton Act, one of two primary federal antitrust
laws, to authorize state attorneys general to “bring a civil action in the name of such State, as parens patriae on behalf of
natural persons residing in such State . . . to secure monetary
84. Ratliff, supra note 76, at 1865 (observing “sparse” use of parens in
consumer protection area).
85. The Minnesota Attorney General, for example, has relied on common
law parens in seeking public compensation, but Minnesota courts have mixed
citations to parens authority with cases basing public compensation on statutory injunctive relief. State ex rel. Humphrey v. Alpine Air Prods., Inc., 490
N.W.2d 888, 896 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), aff’d, 500 N.W.2d 788 (Minn. 1993).
The primary enforcement statute used by the Minnesota Attorney General
later was amended to recognize the existence of public compensation as a remedy and to provide ancillary authority for its administration. MINN. STAT.
§ 8.31 subdiv. 2(c) (2014) (providing that undistributed public compensation
can be paid to the public treasury); id. at subdiv. 3(c) (authorizing appointment of administrator for public compensation).
86. AM. BAR ASS’N, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS (SEVENTH) 633–34
(2012).
87. Conners, supra note 16, at 43–46, 51–52.
88. Stephen Calkins, Perspectives on State and Federal Antitrust Enforcement, 53 DUKE L.J. 673, 682–84 (2003).
89. 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
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90

relief.” Unlike federal enforcement agencies, states can obtain
91
treble damages for antitrust violations under this authority.
Congress added this statutory parens authority substantially
because of a concern that injured consumers were unable to obtain compensation either through federal agency actions or private class actions given adverse decisional law complicating
class certification when individual consumer injury is small
92
and injured consumers difficult to identify. In recognition of
this diffuse injury problem, Congress allowed the states to obtain consumer recovery using loosened standards of proof for
93
damages.
Congress also established procedures for state enforcement
under the Clayton Act that are similar to a class action but
more flexible. The Clayton Act requires notice by state attorneys general to potential consumer recipients—at least by publication or directly to consumers as needed “according to the
circumstances of the case” if the court determines that notice
94
“solely by publication would deny due process of law.” Consumers have the right to opt out of inclusion in the state attorney general action, but uniquely in the area of public compensation, the Clayton Act provides for statutory preclusion of
95
claims when the consumer does not exercise opt-out rights.
Settlement requires judicial review and further notice prior to
96
effectuation of statutory preclusion.
The less rigorous requirements for proving damages and
the more flexible notice and review procedures represent a legislative choice to establish an alternative public scheme to pri97
vate class actions for certain antitrust violations. The focus on
90. 15 U.S.C. § 15c (2012).
91. Id. § 15c(a)(2).
92. New York ex rel. Vacco v. Reebok Int’l Ltd., 96 F.3d 44, 46 (2d Cir.
1996) (“Congress empowered state attorneys general to investigate and prosecute antitrust abuses on behalf of consumers stymied by Rule 23’s certification
and notification hurdles.”); Susan Beth Farmer, More Lessons from the Laboratories: Cy Pres Distributions in Parens Patriae Antitrust Actions Brought by
State Attorneys General, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 361, 376–79 (1999).
93. Farmer, supra note 92, at 381–82.
94. 15 U.S.C. § 15c(b)(1).
95. Id. § 15c(b)(2)–(3).
96. Id. § 15c(c); see Farmer, supra note 92, at 383–85 (describing procedures for state enforcement under the Clayton Act and observing that the “notice and claim preclusion provisions of the statute are as creative as the section on estimation of damages”).
97. See Farmer, supra note 92, at 381, 383; First, supra note 27, at 1005–
13.

2016]

PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT COMPENSATION

2331

compensation as a defining characteristic of state antitrust enforcement suits under the Clayton Act, and the preclusive effect
and procedural requirements in the Act give this type of action
a different character than other public enforcement actions. As
a result, some aspects of the relationship between public compensation and private rights present differently in state antitrust enforcement compared to other forms of public compensa98
tion—a point that recurs in this Article.
5. Summary of Public Compensation Legal Authority
Almost all public compensation is based on some form of
statutory authority. The following chart shows the authority
used by various government enforcers to obtain public compensation. The larger oval represents a form of legal authority
based wholly or partly in statute.

Common Law Parens
 Some state AG
Statutory Parens
 State AG antitrust (Clayton Act and some state
law)
 Some state AG under
federal consumer law

Express Statutory
 Most state AG
UDAP and state financial regulators
 Some state AG antitrust
 CFPB
 OCC/FDIC
 SEC (partial)
 FTC (secondary)
 EEOC
 DOJ

Statutory Injunctive
 Some state AG
UDAP and antitrust
 FTC (primary)
 SEC (partial)
 CFTC
 Misc. federal agency
(e.g., HUD)

Figure 1: Overview of public compensation authority.

98. Antitrust enforcement is further complicated by the fact that federal
law allows for damages only to “direct purchasers” from the antitrust violator.
State law, however, allows for damages to “indirect purchasers,” such as buyers of a breakfast cereal who paid slightly higher prices for the product because suppliers of an input into the product engaged in price collusion that
raised the prices of those inputs to cereal manufacturers. Waller, supra note
30, at 218–19. The state law authority for public compensation with indirect
purchaser suits varies, with sixteen states providing express statutory authority, fourteen states providing for a statutory grant of parens authority similar
to the Clayton Act, thirteen states relying on some combination of judicial interpretation of statutory and common law authority, and eight states using a
class action mechanism. In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 205
F.R.D. 369, 386–88 (D.D.C. 2002).
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II. THE CRITIQUE OF PUBLIC COMPENSATION
In 1969, John Wade and Robert Kamenshine published an
article analyzing whether and when public compensation
99
should be awarded. Wade and Kamenshine generally lauded
the potential for public compensation and urged, along with
U.S. Senator Warren Magnuson, that “[t]his method would
vindicate not only the interests of those already defrauded, but
hopefully would also deter unscrupulous businessmen from
100
pursuing new schemes.” After decades of scholarly silence,
most recent commentators reach a less favorable evaluation.
This Part begins with the observation of recent scholarship that
public compensation cases “mimic” class action cases and that
the two types of cases raise similar concerns as to adequate
representation of and consent by recipients. The second subpart
examines one particular branch of scholarship for which the relationship between private rights and public compensation is
central—the assertion that public compensation precludes the
rights of compensated individuals to bring a later private action.
A. SIMILARITIES IN THE SCHOLARLY CRITIQUE
The commonality in most of the recent scholarly critiques
of public compensation is three observations. First, these scholars note the similarities between public compensation and
monetary recovery in class action cases. Both types of actions
return money to groups of people, leading to observations that
101
public compensation “mimics,” “mirrors,” or “bears a striking
102
resemblance” to class action cases. Not only do these actions
superficially look the same, but according to these scholars pub103
lic compensation cases “perform the same job” or “serve the
99. Wade & Kamenshine, supra note 17, at 1031. Student commentators
of the period opined on the authority of specific government entities to obtain
such relief. See, e.g., Note, Ancillary Relief in SEC Injunction Suits for Violation of Rule 10b-5, 79 HARV. L. REV. 656 (1966); Allan Jergesen, Note, New
York City’s Alternative to the Consumer Class Action: The Government as Robin Hood, 9 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 301, 307 (1972); Restitution in Food and Drug
Enforcement, 4 STAN. L. REV. 519 (1952).
100. Wade & Kamenshine, supra note 17, at 1050.
101. See Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 519; see also Max Minzner, Should
Agencies Enforce?, 99 MINN. L. REV. 2113, 2153 (2015) (observing that agency
actions obtaining restitution “mirror class actions in both their goals and their
overall structure”).
102. Lemos, supra note 7, at 487.
103. See Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 506 (“[A]gencies should adopt rules
from representative litigation, like those that govern class action settlements,
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same aggregative function as private damages class actions.”
Public compensation has been labeled an “agency class ac105
106
tion” or “‘executive branch’ class action,” and the govern107
ment enforcer has been called “public class counsel.”
Second, these scholars describe the lesser procedural requirements for public compensation compared to class ac108
tions. Class actions require notice to class members, allow for
objections by class members to settlement terms, permit class
members to opt out of the litigation and provide for judicial re109
view of a settlement. In contrast, these scholars correctly note
that public compensation often occurs without most or all of
110
these procedural rights, and that when these procedures ap111
ply to public compensation they usually are less rigorous.
The third observation is that government enforcers neither
adequately represent the interests of the recipients of relief nor
have procedures to involve recipients in the distribution of relief. According to these critiques, public officials and compensation recipients have multiple conflicting interests, such as the
112
government’s interest in receiving funds, the “political ambi113
tions” of an elected official and influence of campaign finance
114
115
donors, reputational concerns of the agency, capture of a
when agencies, in effect, perform the same job.”).
104. See Lemos, supra note 7, at 510.
105. Sant’Ambrogio & Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 1992.
106. Adam S. Zimmerman, The Corrective Justice State, 5 J. TORT L. 189,
191 (2012).
107. See generally Verity Winship, Fair Funds and the SEC’s Compensation of Injured Investors, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1103 (2008).
108. See Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 520 (“[M]ost agency settlements afford only the most minimal level of process.”).
109. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2), 23(d)(1)(B), 23(e)(1) (notice to class members);
id. at 23(e)(5) (right of class members to object to settlement); id. at 23(e) (judicial review and approval of settlement required).
110. See Lemos, supra note 7, at 499–511; Zimmerman, supra note 7, at
553–71 (considering three potential reforms of multidistrict coordination, negotiated rulemaking, and judicial hard look review).
111. See Sant’Ambrogio & Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 2016–34.
112. See Lemos, supra note 7, at 513; see also Davis, supra note 7.
113. See Adam S. Zimmerman, Mass Settlement Rivalries, 82 U. CIN. L.
REV. 381, 392 (2013) (noting conflicts between different victims “may pale in
comparison” to conflicts with “[p]olitically ambitious attorneys general”); see
also Davis, supra note 7, at 46.
114. See Lemos, supra note 7, at 515 (arguing that corporate donors who do
not want injured citizens to receive maximum recoveries donate to attorney
general election campaign funds).
115. See Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 551 (suggesting agencies sometimes
settle matters to resolve embarrassing missteps); see also Davis, supra note 7,
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regulatory agency by the interests of the regulated entity, the
use of private counsel on contract with their own financial in117
terests, and an interest in the jobs of those working for the
118
defendant. These critics also conclude that government enforcers provide insufficient notice of and opportunity to participate in public compensation cases and fail to involve potential
119
recipients in the size or shape of public compensation.
These observations beget a conclusion—that the lesser procedural protections in public compensation are not justified by
the differences in compensation outcomes between public enforcement and private aggregate litigation. Class action procedures are designed to protect the interests of the class members. Notice and rights to object or opt out exist to reflect, as
much as possible in private aggregate litigation, the consent of
120
the class members to participation in the litigation. Judicial
review of class actions exists, in part, to ensure that the class
counsel and the representative plaintiff adequately represent
121
the interests of class members. The critics argue that applying class action procedures to public compensation would help
resolve the observed conflicts of interest of public officials with
the recipients of compensation and the lack of participation
122
rights for recipients.
B. CONCERN THAT PUBLIC COMPENSATION VIOLATES DUE
PROCESS PROTECTIONS
Scholarly critics argue that a lack of procedural requirements for public compensation results in inadequate or unfair
at 46 (contending that political ambitions may skew enforcement priorities).
116. See Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 551–53.
117. See Davis, supra note 7, at 46; Lemos, supra note 7, at 515–16 (contending that private counsel have personal incentives to maximize the recovery for the class because the attorneys’ fees increase as the clients’ recovery
grows).
118. See Lemos, supra note 7, at 513–14 (noting that a large recovery for
the consumers of the parens patriae group may put the defendant out of business).
119. See id. at 519–20; Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 546–49.
120. 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1786 (3d ed. 2005).
121. John Coffee famously described the agency cost problems that arise in
class action litigation because class members cannot, or lack incentives to,
control class counsel conduct. Morris Ratner, A New Model of Plaintiffs’ Class
Action Attorneys, 31 REV. LITIG. 757, 763–74 (2012) (describing Coffee’s critique).
122. Davis, supra note 7, at 41; Lemos, supra note 7, at 548.
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123

distributions to recipients of public compensation. The article
by Lemos compels particular attention because it argues that
the purported problems with public compensation rise to the
level of possible constitutional deprivations.
Lemos examines state attorneys general enforcement and
asserts that public compensation in these state cases precludes
124
later assertion of private claims for monetary relief. She contends that “[a]lthough the case law on the preclusive effect of
public aggregate litigation is surprisingly sparse, the prevailing
view is that the judgment in a state case is binding ‘on every
125
person whom the state represents . . . .’” Consistent with the
assumption that public compensation is the functional equivalent of class action relief, Lemos asserts that state attorneys
general represent the recipients of public compensation and
thus that public compensation precludes a later private claim
126
for monetary relief. Lemos argues that conflicts of interest
127
are “more stark” and the prospects for client monitoring “are
128
even darker” in state public compensation cases compared to
class action cases.
Putting together these assertions, Lemos concludes that
public compensation raises constitutional Due Process concerns
because state attorneys general do not adequately represent

123. See Sant’Ambrogio & Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 2007; Zimmerman,
supra note 7, at 500; Zimmerman, supra note 106, at 219. Another branch of
scholarship on public compensation is limited to investor recovery in securities
cases. This scholarship does not strictly follow the pattern described above and
is largely concerned with coordination of public and private actions. Verity
Winship argues that SEC public compensation should focus on cases in which
private actions are not feasible. Winship, supra note 107, at 1141–45. The
Velikonja study establishes that this is largely the approach taken by the SEC
and its public compensation is appropriately adequate in amount. Velikonja,
supra note 35, at 338; see also Black, supra note 67 (arguing that the SEC
generally should refrain from seeking public compensation to efficiently use
resources and not hinder private actions); Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 556–
63 (focusing largely on SEC cases in discussing coordination of public compensation and private enforcement). For a particularly thoughtful examination of
the relationship of public and private enforcement, see David Freeman
Engstrom, Private Enforcement’s Pathways: Lessons from Qui Tam Litigation,
114 COLUM. L. REV. 1913 (2014).
124. Lemos, supra note 7, at 500.
125. Id. Lemos similarly states: “Case law on parens patriae preclusion is
remarkably thin, but the consensus view seems to be that public suits preclude all private actions raising the same claims.” Id. at 531.
126. Lemos, supra note 7, at 535.
127. Id. at 530.
128. Id. at 519.
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the interests of public compensation recipients. Lemos proposes that states remedy these purported constitutional concerns by either adopting laws providing that preclusion does
not result from public compensation, or creating procedures
similar to a class action when state attorneys general seek pub130
lic compensation. Other scholars also have raised concerns
about public compensation precluding later private claims for
monetary relief without adequate representation of compensa131
tion recipients.
III. PRECLUSION, PUBLIC COMPENSATION, AND FALSE
ALARM
The starting point for understanding the relationship between public compensation and private rights is determining
whether public compensation precludes later assertion of private rights for monetary relief. The case law is reasonably clear
that public compensation generally does not result in preclu-

129. Id. at 531–42.
130. Id. at 542–48.
131. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Constructing Issue Classes, 101 VA. L.
REV. 1855, 1924 (2015) (“Precluding private suits in the wake of a parens
patriae action can be particularly problematic since those suits have not been
subjected to Rule 23’s adequacy requirement and attorneys general may prioritize political agendas and quick resolution over private claimants’ interests.”).
Seth Davis analyzes the broader question of government use of an implied
right of action in the absence of express statutory authority. Davis identifies
four types of such implied actions, including the category of “substitute suits,”
which includes actions seeking public compensation. Davis, supra note 7, at
22–24. Davis asserts that these suits preclude later private claims and observes that this result is at odds with the procedural protections in class actions. Thus, these suits “may wrest control of private rights from an individual
beneficiary without the procedures that protect a beneficiary’s right to her day
in court.” Id. at 41 (“[W]hile the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prescribe
mechanisms to ensure adequate representation in class actions, no such
mechanisms apply to substitute suits.”). Davis makes substantially similar
observations and conclusions as the new scholarship about the equivalence of
public and private purpose and the inadequacy of representation by state attorneys general in “substitute suits” because of conflicting interests with the
recipients of public relief. Id. at 42. Davis presumes in his analysis that public
enforcement actions preclude both injunctive remedies and public compensation. Id. He later considers and rejects the option of limiting preclusion of private claims to injunctive relief as a means of addressing the problem. Id.; see
also Verity Winship, Policing Compensatory Relief in Agency Settlements, 82
U. CIN. L. REV. 551 (2013) (arguing that public compensation should be avoided when individuals are precluded from bringing claims). Winship observes,
however, that preclusion does not apply to private actions following SEC enforcement. Id. at 556.
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132

sion of private claims for monetary relief. Accordingly, concerns about Due Process protections for recipients are misplaced. The first subpart looks at judicial decisions and litigation practice bearing on the preclusive effect of public
compensation on subsequently asserted private claims, an
analysis not systematically undertaken in the prior scholarship. The Lemos article gets this basic proposition wrong. The
second subpart examines the reasons underlying this error,
which leads to a broader discussion of how and when public
compensation should occur.
A. GENERAL RULE OF NON-PRECLUSION
As Edward Cooper succinctly states, “[t]he central proposition that a party is bound (by a prior result) is balanced by the
133
rule that ordinarily nonparties are not bound.” Because an
enforcement action is public in nature and brought by the government, public compensation cannot preclude a later action by
a private beneficiary of that relief unless an exception to this
principle applies. Existing case law and litigation practice is
sufficiently clear to conclude that public compensation generally does not preclude later private suits for monetary relief.
1. Case Law on Preclusion of Subsequent Private Actions
In General Telephone Co. v. EEOC, the U.S. Supreme
Court reached the conclusion that public compensation obtained by the EEOC does not “bind” the recipients of that com134
pensation in later private suits. The EEOC accused General
Telephone Company of gender discrimination by restricting
maternity leave and access to jobs and promotions for a large
group of women in four western states, and it sought injunctive
135
relief and backpay as remedies in its enforcement action.
General Telephone argued that the EEOC should be required
to use class action procedures to obtain public compensation in
136
the form of backpay. The Court rejected this argument, noting that an EEOC enforcement action did not act as a “proxy”
132. See infra Part III.A.
133. 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 4448 (2d ed. 1987). The limited boundaries of nonparty preclusion was emphasized in the U.S. Supreme Court’s rejection of the “theory of virtual representation.” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 904 (2008).
134. 446 U.S. 318, 333 (1980).
135. Id. at 319–21.
136. Id. at 321.
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for the employees for whom it sought relief. Rather, the
EEOC sought to “vindicate the public interest in preventing
employment discrimination,” even when seeking public com138
pensation.
The Court then directly addressed the preclusion issue. It
observed that General Telephone’s objective in seeking the use
of the class procedures was to obtain the preclusive effect of a
139
class. The Court treated the matter as one of statutory inter140
pretation. It found that mandating preclusion would conflict
with the intent of Congress in prohibiting gender discrimination and providing wide discretion for trial courts to exercise
equitable powers to achieve this result, especially given “the
possible differences between the public and private interests
141
involved.” The Court observed that a trial court could order
that individuals be required to choose to release claims as a
condition of receiving public compensation if appropriate in a
given case, stating that the “Title VII remedy is an equitable
142
one; a court of equity should adjust the relief accordingly.”
EEOC public compensation, therefore, has been found not pre143
clusive of later private claims.
Three years prior to the decision in General Telephone, the
California Supreme Court had reached an identical result in an
action brought by the California Attorney General. In People v.
Pacific Land Research, the defendants created and sold subdivided real estate parcels without proper notice to the California
Real Estate Commissioner and by use of unfair and deceptive
144
practices. The California Attorney General brought an action
under express statutory authority and sought the familiar troika of remedies—injunctive relief, civil penalties, and restitu145
tion. Defendants argued that the state should comply with
class action procedures when seeking restitution for a group of
137. Id. at 326.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 332.
140. Id. at 330.
141. Id. at 333.
142. Id.
143. Circuit court decisions in the wake of General Telephone have made
this result clear. 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 133, § 4458.1 n.9 (collecting
cases in which preclusion was denied); see also EEOC v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 216
F. Supp. 2d 935, 938–39 (D. Minn. 2002) (extending General Telephone holding
to EEOC enforcement under the Americans with Disabilities Act).
144. 569 P.2d 125, 127 (Cal. 1977).
145. Id. at 127–28.
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purchasers, that this relief should be preceded by notice to the
purchaser group, and that the result as to restitution in the
146
public action should be binding on the purchasers.
In rejecting this argument, the California Supreme Court
noted that its decision might result in an advantage to the land
purchasers because they could benefit from the state action
without relinquishing rights to a later private action, but that
“[t]hese consequences flow not from any inherent unfairness in
the procedures but because the People’s action is fundamentally for the benefit of the public even though founded upon the
same violations of law which form the basis of the (private)
147
claim for restitution.” Relying on Pacific Land Research, a
California appellate court later held that public compensation
resulting from a public enforcement action for deception in sale
of a job training program did not bar later claims for monetary
148
relief by private plaintiffs.
There are two exceptions to the general rule that public
compensation is not preclusive of subsequent private actions for
149
damages. First, the Clayton Act provides for preclusive effect
in the special circumstance of state antitrust enforcement of

146. Id. at 128–32.
147. Id. at 130.
148. Payne v. Nat’l Collection Sys., Inc., 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 260, 266 (Ct.
App. 2001).
149. Although not technically preclusion, “required release” public compensation, in which the government enforcer enters into a settlement or a court
orders that a recipient must execute a release of private claims to obtain public compensation, results in preclusion for those who accept public compensation. See infra Part V.B. The use of an opt-in public compensation procedure is
consistent with no preclusive effect absent the opt-in process, and courts have
refused to find a release of claims by consumers who do not opt-in to public
compensation. Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Grp., Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922
(11th Cir. 1990) (holding that the employee who refused compensation under
EEOC consent decree that required her to release claims to obtain compensation was not precluded from bringing private action for monetary relief); State
v. Peppertree Resort Villas, Inc., 651 N.W.2d 345 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (holding
that the land purchasers who refused public compensation accompanied by
release were not precluded). Also, preclusion can apply when the EEOC seeks
victim-specific relief rather than public compensation, but even in these cases
courts have split as to the preclusive effect of EEOC enforcement. Compare
Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Grp., Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990)
(holding no preclusion even though “the EEOC’s suit against Cerro was based
solely on Riddle’s charge of discrimination; it did not involve a class of employees or an allegation of pattern and practice discrimination”), with Adams v.
Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 697 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (reversing
appellate panel and finding no private right of action when EEOC reached
consent decree as to named employees).
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150

federal law. Second, a small number of enforcement cases by
state attorneys general proceed as class actions, with the result
151
that preclusion applies in this circumstance. In one state,
Alaska, courts have held that public compensation under state
law must be obtained by the application of a form of class action rules, including notice and opt-out rights, and resulting in
152
preclusive effect on later private claims. In both of these exceptional circumstances, government enforcers must comply
with stricter procedural protections to obtain public compensation.
2. Litigation Practice Reflects Non-Preclusion
That subsequent private actions for monetary relief generally are not precluded following public compensation is consistent with observed litigation practice. Two common types of
cases are in conflict with the assertion that public compensation has a preclusive impact—“coattail” class actions, and class
153
certification review subsequent to public compensation.

150. See supra Part I.B.4.
151. See supra note 74.
152. State v. First Nat’l Bank of Anchorage, 660 P.2d 406, 416 (Alaska
1982). The court found that an award of public compensation generally requires that the Alaska Attorney General follow procedures analogous to Rule
23. Id. at 416–17. The court also imposes preclusive effect on later private
claims for monetary relief, but held that use of an opt-in procedure would be
sufficient in that case. Id. at 417. The court’s decision appears to be an isolated
result, even from the case law in other states extant at the time. As its only
authority for the decision, the Alaska court cited an early decision interpreting
New Jersey law providing for public compensation, Kugler v. Romain, 279
A.2d 640, 649 (N.J. 1971), in which the New Jersey Supreme Court noted in
passing that public compensation is “in the nature of a class action.” Id. at
416. In People v. Pacific Land Research Co., which had been decided before the
First National Bank of Anchorage decision, the California Supreme Court also
cited this quote from Kugler and observed that “the matter was settled the following year” by New Jersey courts holding that its Attorney General was not
required to use class action procedures. 569 P.2d 125, 131 n.10 (Cal. 1977).
153. Of course, individuals cannot obtain a double recovery through a later
private suit. The later private suit can only recover the difference between the
consumer’s loss and the amount of public compensation received by the consumer. Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 333 (1980) (“It also goes without
saying that the courts can and should preclude double recovery by an individual.”); SEC v. Risman, 7 F. App’x 30, 31 (2d Cir. 2001) (“In administering the
disgorgement fund, the SEC will be under obligation to ensure that payments
to victims are not made in a manner that would duplicate compensation.”); see
also 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a) (2012) (excluding recovery by a state for a Clayton Act
antitrust claim if it “duplicates amounts which have been awarded for the
same injury”).
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“Coattail” class actions are private class actions using the
information revealed or result obtained in public enforcement
154
cases to seek private relief. These class actions seek damages
following cases where public compensation was sought or
awarded, which is a result at odds with preclusion of a later
155
private action when public compensation was awarded. An
exhaustive study of SEC public compensation cases from 2002
through 2013 found that in 46.8% (108 of 231) of these cases a
156
parallel class action also obtained a monetary settlement.
When parallel SEC and private actions obtained compensation
for investors, the private actions recovered over $39 billion,
157
which accounted for 59% of total investor recovery. The same
158
situation occurs in other regulatory areas. In discussing preclusion of coattail class actions by public enforcement, Howard
Erichson observes that “[r]estricting private claims would generally require legislative action, so such restrictions cannot
159
simply be offered by a negotiating government lawyer.”
A related circumstance inconsistent with preclusion is
when courts determine whether to certify a class action seeking
monetary relief given the existence of public compensation. The
typical putative class seeks certification under Rule 23(b)(3),
which requires a court finding that “a class action is superior to
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating
160
the controversy.” Class action defendants have argued that
class certification is improper following public compensation
because the class action mechanism is not superior to individual claims given prior public compensation. Courts have both
denied and certified class actions in response to these argu161
ments. These class certification motions would make no sense
if courts regularly precluded subsequent private claims. In fact,
154. Erichson, supra note 79, at 5; see Velikonja, supra note 35, at 368.
155. Erichson, supra note 79, at 6.
156. Velikonja, supra note 35, at 369.
157. Id. at 342–47; see also Winship, supra note 131, at 556 (“[S]ettlement
for monetary relief in an SEC action generally does not preclude other actions
by injured investors.”).
158. See, e.g., In re First Databank Antitrust Litig., 209 F. Supp. 2d 96
(D.D.C. 2002) (illustrating a case in which a class obtained additional relief
following FTC antitrust enforcement action).
159. Erichson, supra note 79, at 30. Erichson recounts the attempt by some
state attorneys general to have Congress pass legislation to preclude private
claims against tobacco manufacturers. Id.
160. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.46[2][c] (Matthew Bender ed., 3d ed. 1999).
161. See infra Part V.A.
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courts in these cases have specifically noted the lack of preclu162
sion of private claims in deciding these motions.
3. Public Relief Preclusion Following Public Enforcement
Private rights can be extinguished following an enforcement action without regard to public compensation, but only as
to the public relief sought in the subsequent private action, not
as to private damages claims. The exact line between public
and private relief is not precise, but the ends of the continuum
are clear enough. Courts generally do not allow private actions
to proceed if the relief sought changes the terms of an injunction or required conduct to remedy a public resource or problem
resulting from the enforcement action. Courts allow a later private action seeking monetary relief, with the sometimes exception of punitive damages.
Satsky v. Paramount Communications, Inc. offers a clear
example of this result in applying common law preclusion to
163
private claims following a public enforcement action. The
Satsky plaintiffs were property owners near a mine that had
164
long discharged toxic waste. The mine was subject to environmental cleanup under a consent decree following litigation
in which the State of Colorado asserted liability of the mine
owner under the federal Comprehensive Environmental Re165
The plaintiffs
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act.
sought multiple types of relief, including various types of dam166
ages and an injunction. The defendant mine owner argued
that the government consent decree precluded later private
167
claims. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that preclusion doctrines barred claims “based on injuries to the natural
resources held by the State of Colorado” but permitted claims
for “purely private interests,” and remanded to the district
court to distinguish among the many remedies sought by the
168
plaintiffs.
162. See, e.g., Kamm v. Cal. City Dev. Co., 509 F.2d 205, 212 (9th Cir.
1975) (stating that one factor in denying class certification was that “[n]o
member of the class is barred from initiating a suit on his own behalf”).
163. 7 F.3d 1464 (10th Cir. 1993).
164. Id. at 1465.
165. Id. at 1467.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1470. The court held that neither the parens doctrine nor federal
environmental law allowed the state to assert purely private interests. The
State of Colorado appeared amicus curiae in support of the plaintiff’s position
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Numerous commentators have noted that public enforcement actions have a differing preclusive effect based on the
169
type of relief sought in the later private suit. There are gray
areas, of course. Courts have, for instance, allowed private parties to litigate claims for injunctive relief in the face of a con170
sent decree obtained by a federal antitrust enforcer, yet precluded punitive damages claims brought by private parties
following a government action.
This latter situation is illustrated well by private actions
brought in the wake of the 1990s settlement of lawsuits by
state attorneys general against tobacco companies. The settlement between state attorneys general and the tobacco companies released state claims for civil penalties and punitive dam171
ages. In the private actions that followed, courts reached
differing results as to preclusion of punitive damages claims
depending on whether the court characterized the purpose of
punitive damages under state law as deterrence for the public
172
good or to compensate private injury. Even the courts that
that it did not represent plaintiffs’ private interests in the prior public enforcement litigation. See also Alderwoods Grp., Inc. v. Garcia, 119 So. 3d 497,
503–04 n.6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review dismissed, 131 So. 3d 787 (Fla. 2013)
(holding that plaintiffs barred from seeking injunctive relief against cemetery
following public action for licensing violations that obtained injunctive relief
and operational changes, but “plaintiffs are not barred from seeking damages”).
169. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 41 illus. 6–7 (AM. LAW INST.
1982) (stating that a taxpayer suit to challenge restrictions on the statutorily
permissible operations of a charity would be precluded by a prior state attorney general action, but a suit by an employee for “relief for himself” can proceed in the face of a prior government suit resulting in injunctive relief to restrain illegal employment practices); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE
LITIGATION § 1.02 cmt. B(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (concluding that in
parens cases, “governmental action on a general interest cannot preclude a
private-damages action brought to obtain compensation for a loss”); 18A
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 133, § 4458.1 (“In most circumstances . . . it should
be presumed that public enforcement actions are not intended to foreclose traditional common-law claims or private remedies expressly created by statute.”).
170. In Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683 (1961), the
Court refused to allow intervention under a prior iteration of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 42 by a group of smaller publishers in a federal antitrust enforcement action against larger publishers because the smaller publishers
could pursue injunctive relief in the face of a consent decree in the government
action. The Court stated that it is “fully settled that a person whose private
interests coincide with the public interest in government antitrust litigation is
nonetheless not bound by the eventuality of such litigation.” Id. at 689.
171. See Erichson, supra note 79, at 9–16 (explaining how state action
against the tobacco industry paved the way for private action).
172. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Adequately Representing Groups, 81
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found punitive damages claims precluded as public relief made
it clear that state attorneys general acting under common law
parens authority could not release private claims for compensation due to injuries from smoking. As the Georgia Supreme
Court stated, for purposes of preclusion in a private suit following a state parens action, “the State and its citizens can be privies . . . only with regard to public claims; they cannot be privies
173
with regard to private claims.”
B. THE FALSE SCHOLARLY ALARM
The above law and practice cannot be squared with the assertion in the Lemos article that—as a result of the “prevailing
174
view” of courts that private claims are precluded following
public compensation in state attorneys general cases without
appropriate procedural protections—new and onerous procedural requirements for public compensation are the constitu175
tional “price of preclusion.” The scope of inquiry in the Lemos
article, and similarly defined here, is a public action “that seeks
to remedy or prevent unlawful activity by obtaining some form
176
of direct financial relief for injured citizens.” The concern over
preclusion resulting from these actions, therefore, must focus
on situations in which an injured private plaintiff was barred
from litigating a claim for financial relief as a result of a public
enforcement action. Such cases, surprisingly, are absent in the
177
article. Because no judicial decision holds that preclusion of
FORDHAM L. REV. 3043, 3075–78 (2013) (describing varying results as to preclusion of punitive damages claims in coattail class actions following state attorneys general actions against tobacco companies).
173. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Gault, 627 S.E.2d 549 (2006);
see also Curtis v. Altria Grp., Inc., 813 N.W.2d 891, 904 (Minn. 2012). Curtis
turns the preclusion analysis upside down by holding that the state attorney
general tobacco actions which obtained public relief other than public compensation results in preclusion of a later suit seeking private damages under state
UDAP laws. This result flows from the broad “public benefit” restriction imposed by Minnesota courts, which eliminated private rights of action under
Minnesota UDAP law following any public enforcement. Id. at 899 (“We have
previously concluded that the right of a private litigant to bring a lawsuit under subdivision 3a is limited by the authority given the State AG.” (citing Ly v.
Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 313 (Minn. 2000))).
174. Lemos, supra note 7, at 500.
175. Id. at 548.
176. Id. at 492.
177. The cases cited in the article generally did not involve the award of
public compensation and clearly did not hold that public compensation is preclusive of later private claims for monetary relief absent statutory directive to
that effect. Lemos references a mid-level Illinois state appellate decision,
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private monetary relief claims follows public compensation
from a state attorney general action without procedural protections similar to a class action, the Lemos article is plainly
wrong about the prevailing view of courts, especially when that
assertion is directly contrary to substantial case law and prac178
tice patterns.
This error highlights the problem with conceiving of public
compensation as an abstract practice disconnected from the law
and context of public enforcement. The first subpart below describes the error as a consequence of failing to distinguish between varying legal authority for public compensation. The second subpart introduces the inapposite use of adequate
representation as a gauge for structuring public compensation
without properly placing this remedy in the broader context of
public enforcement; an idea that is then developed more fully in
Part IV.

Bonovich v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 310 N.E.2d 710 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974),
which held that a private antitrust suit should be dismissed following a decision at trial for defendants in a parallel action brought by the Illinois Attorney
General. To the extent this decision has relevance to the issues here, later Illinois state court decisions explicitly reject its reasoning. Jackson v. Callan
Publ’g, Inc., 826 N.E.2d 413 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (rejecting Bonovich as good
law and reversing dismissal of a private class action of police officers seeking
equitable relief in the form of a constructive trust); People ex rel. Fahner v.
Climatemp, Inc., 428 N.E.2d 1096, 1100 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (“[W]e believe that
the Bonovich court’s definition of ‘same parties’ is overly broad.”). The decision
also predates the federal statutory scheme for state attorney general antitrust
public compensation under federal law adopted in 1976. See supra Part I.B.4.
178. This Article does not take the position that it is fully settled law that
public compensation can never result in preclusion of later private claims in
any circumstances. Perhaps the best argument that a circumstance exists for
finding public enforcement precludes later private claims for monetary relief
would be to focus on a state attorney general enforcement action using only
common law parens authority and seeking only damages. Even in this scenario, preclusion seems unlikely because a fundamental parens principle is the
separation of the interests of the state and the interests of the citizens; the
state must represent “quasi-sovereign” interests, not private interests. Parens
“does not involve the States stepping in to represent the interests of particular
citizens who, for whatever reason, cannot represent themselves.” Snapp & Son
v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982). Although this question is
an all but untraveled side road as to current practice, it might have theoretical
interest, especially given prominent scholars encouraging state attorneys general to bring such cases to fill the enforcement gap caused by judicial limits on
class actions. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 11. This theoretical potential
for preclusion, however, is wholly different than the factual assertion by
Lemos about the prevailing view of courts. That assertion is simply wrong.

2346

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[100:2313

1. Differences in Authority Explain Preclusion Outcomes
A careful look at the cited support for Lemos’s assertion
about preclusion suggests that it can be explained substantially
by a failure to understand that public compensation has different contours under different statutory schemes. The article directly supports its contention about the prevailing view of
courts by quoting a law review article discussing solely state
attorneys general antitrust suits brought under the Clayton
179
Act. As we have seen, preclusion of private claims following
state attorney general enforcement under the Clayton Act is
based in statute and has a unique origin and structure, including a requirement of using procedures that comport with Due
Process, so preclusion in this specific context cannot be general180
ized to other areas of public compensation.
The Lemos article also glosses over the different types of
legal authority under which state attorneys general pursue
181
public compensation. Although her article acknowledges that
most state attorneys general enforcement actions proceed un182
der statutory authority, it emphasizes the special concerns
that arise in state use of common law parens authority. A focus
on common law parens doctrine limits the relevance of the critique to the broader topic of public compensation because this
remedy almost always has a statutory basis, in state attorneys
183
general cases and other public enforcement actions. Yet even
179. Lemos partially quotes Farmer as part of her formulation of the critical supposition underlying her argument: “Although the case law on the preclusive effect of public aggregate litigation is surprisingly sparse, the prevailing view is that the judgment in a state case is binding ‘on every person whom
the state represents . . . .’” Lemos, supra note 7, at 500 (citing Farmer, supra
note 92, at 384). Farmer, however, was writing solely about the state attorney
general statutory parens authority in the Clayton Act. Indeed, the entire sentence from which Lemos extracts a clause refers specifically to the notice and
opt-out rights in the Clayton Act: “Because parens patriae group members are
presumed to have had notice of the action and an opportunity to opt out of the
litigation, a judgment is conclusive on every person whom the state represents
as parens patriae.” Farmer, supra note 92, at 384 (citations omitted). Farmer
also observes that the Clayton Act procedural requirements “protect the consumers’ constitutional right to be heard.” Id. (citation omitted).
180. See supra Part I.B.4; see also In re Elec. Books Antitrust Litig., 14 F.
Supp. 3d 525, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding that Due Process does not necessitate use of class action rules in state antitrust action under the Clayton Act).
181. Lemos also sees no reason to differentiate between restitution and
damages. Lemos, supra note 7, at 498 (“[T]he differences between restitution
and other monetary damages are immaterial for present purposes . . . .”).
182. Lemos, supra note 7, at 497–98.
183. See supra Part I.B.
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with such a narrow emphasis, the article does not identify any
case in which state attorneys general used common law parens
184
authority to obtain public compensation.
Instead, the article cites cases, including Satsky, that hold
private parties are precluded only from seeking injunctive re185
lief. Those cases are consistent with the absence of prelusion
as to public compensation. In fact, several of the judicial decisions cited in the Lemos article explicitly hold that private
damages claims are not precluded following a public enforce186
ment action.
2. Private Interests in Public Enforcement
The Lemos article cites some of the relevant case law about
preclusion in discussing purported Due Process concerns about
adequate representation, rather than using these cases to shed
light on the predicate question of whether and when private
claims are precluded following public compensation. The article
jumps to constitutional concerns with this explanation:
Such suits blur the lines between public and private, raising difficult
questions about their effect on subsequent private litigation. The difficulty stems from the fact that the state clearly does purport to represent private interests when it seeks damages or restitution on behalf of injured citizens. The operative question for preclusion
184. Lemos states that “[d]octrinal puzzles aside, states do use parens
patriae actions to obtain damages and other monetary remedies for their citizens,” supra note 7, at 497, but cites as support only law review articles discussing industry-wide cases against tobacco, guns, and lead paint manufacturers, which are not public compensation cases. See supra notes 78–79 and
accompanying text.
185. Lemos, supra note 7, at 500 n.55. Lemos also explicates the suits following the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the public enforcement actions of which were
unrelated to public compensation. Id. at 533–36. Lemos also cites the earlier
discussed coattail tobacco class actions. Id. at 528.
186. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Gault, 627 S.E.2d 549, 552
(Ga. 2006) (“[P]laintiffs’ claim for compensatory damages is of a private, individual nature, [but] it cannot be said that plaintiffs and the State are in privity with respect to such claims.”); Fabiano v. Philip Morris Inc., 862 N.Y.S.2d
487 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (“[I]t is undoubtedly true that plaintiffs’ private
claims seeking compensation for personal injury could not have been prosecuted by the Attorney General ‘within the parens patriae umbrella,’ the claim asserted by them for punitive damages is not similarly disqualified, for punitive
damages claims are quintessentially and exclusively public in their ultimate
orientation and purpose.” (citations omitted)); see also Satsky v. Paramount
Commc’ns, Inc., 7 F.3d 1464 (10th Cir. 1993); supra notes 163–68 and accompanying text. In United States v. Olin Corp., 606 F. Supp. 1301 (N.D. Ala.
1985), the court severed plaintiffs’ claim for damages from their claim for injunctive relief and the finding of preclusion was “directed solely against the
severed injunctive claim.” Id. at 1304.
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purposes is thus not whether the state “understood [itself] to be acting in a representative capacity”—plainly it did. Instead, the validity
of preclusion turns on whether the state representation was constitu187
tionally “adequate.”

The statement that state attorneys general “plainly” intend
to represent private interests in seeking public compensation is
unsupported in the article and probably often inaccurate. But
more importantly, the intent of government enforcers is beside
the point for purposes of determining preclusion. The legal authority for public compensation gives government enforcers the
right to seek benefit for private individuals within the context
of public enforcement designed to achieve broader public bene188
fits. Whether or not the government enforcer conceives of itself as representing the interests of a group of recipients when
seeking public compensation, it can only seek what it has authority to obtain in a public enforcement action, not all the relief that any individual in the group is entitled to seek in a private action.
It is consistent with preclusion law, therefore, for a government enforcer to take the position that it intends to represent the private interests of consumers, investors or employees
in seeking public compensation in a public enforcement action
and that any public compensation it obtains is not preclusive of
a later suit for additional recovery by those individuals. The
FTC took exactly this stance in opposing intervention by a putative class in a UDAP enforcement action against a seller of
189
Bitcoin “mining” equipment.
The focus on adequacy of representation as an abstract
principle in the new scholarly critiques reflects the importance
ascribed in those critiques to the observation that public compensation looks like a class action case. If public compensation
is a mimic of a private class action, then it may seem a straight
line to the conclusion that government enforcers must represent the private interests of the relief recipients using the same
187. Lemos, supra note 7, at 535 (footnotes omitted).
188. See infra Part IV.A.
189. The FTC argued that it adequately protected the interests of the class
members because “[w]hile all enforcement actions serve a general public interest in deterring violations of the FTC Act and thereby protecting consumers,
this action also serves the narrower goal of attempting to make the specific
victims of those violations whole.” Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 26, Alexander
v. FTC, No. 14-3286 (8th Cir. Jan. 16, 2015). The FTC also argued that the
class members would not be barred from receiving relief as a result of the FTC
public compensation relief, noting that concerns about preclusion were an “especially weak link” in the putative class counsel’s argument. Id. at 15.
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procedures required of class counsel. But the premise that
seeking public compensation converts public enforcement into
the equivalent of a private action is incorrect, as explained in
the following Part.
IV. FAILURE OF THE CLASS ACTION ANALOGY
The claim that state attorneys general violate Due Process
by obtaining public compensation obviously fails when private
monetary claims are not precluded by public compensation, or
when public compensation has adequate procedural protections
in the infrequent cases where it results in preclusion. This
leaves the less forceful but important argument that public
compensation would be more accountable and transparent if it
followed class action procedures. The underlying critique and
suggested reform rest almost entirely on the analogy between
public compensation and class action cases. This analogy fails
because government enforcers obtain public compensation as
part of their discretion in bringing and shaping public enforcement actions, which means accountability for public compensation should be measured by the goals and structure of exercise
of this discretion by government enforcers rather than norms of
class action law.
This Part proceeds as follows: The first subpart explores
the discretionary authority of government enforcers in seeking
and structuring remedies. The second subpart argues that legislative decisions to grant enforcers discretionary authority in
seeking enforcement remedies means government enforcers
tasked with public objectives are not accountable to the private
interests of individual recipients of relief. Government enforcers face a variety of pressures to resolve conflicting interests in
enforcement actions, and the decision to seek public compensation as a remedy is no more, and may be less, subject to conflicts with various private interests in the enforcement action
than the conflicts that arise from other enforcement decisions.
The second subpart also places the class action analogy in the
context of other largely unsuccessful arguments by enforcement
defendants that public compensation should be treated as a
form of government class action. The third subpart outlines
practical reasons that class action procedures are an ill fit for
determining the award and structure of public compensation.
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A. ENFORCER DISCRETION IN SEEKING AND IMPLEMENTING
REMEDIES
Government enforcers exercise substantial discretion in
determining when to seek public compensation and how it is
structured. They can compromise the amount of or distribution
scheme for public compensation in favor of other enforcement
remedies as a matter of policy or as applied in specific case negotiations.
1. Remedial Options in Public Enforcement
Government enforcers seek three types of relief for violations of civil law—injunctions (or administrative orders restraining future conduct), civil penalties, and public compensation. They commonly seek and obtain all three types of relief in
the same enforcement action. The distribution of remedies varies by the objectives, resources, and legal constraints of the parties to the action.
190
Deterrence is the core goal of civil law enforcement. Injunctions, or similar forms of administrative orders, are central
to public enforcement because they are aimed at directly deterring future misconduct by proscribing or requiring future conduct. Injunctive relief occurs in most public enforcement ac191
Civil enforcement actions also deter through the
tions.
assessment of civil penalties. The potential size of such penalties can vary tremendously depending on the amount and calculation of number of violations set forth in the authorizing

190. Velikonja, supra note 35, at 359 (“The primary purpose of the SEC’s
enforcement activity is deterrence.”); Jack B. Weinstein, Compensation for
Mass Private Delicts: Evolving Roles of Administrative, Criminal, and Tort
Law, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 952 (noting that government agencies “seek to
deter by fines, injunctions, and orders for disgorgement and restitution”). But
see Minzner, supra note 101, at 2129–31 (arguing that enforcement agencies
can use retributive theories of punishment).
191. Hoffman, supra note 25, at 1386 (“In the usual case, at least at the
federal level, the government will have obtained or will be seeking prospective
relief and perhaps civil or criminal penalties.”); see also Brief for Center for
Responsible Lending & AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Nevada v. Bank of Am. Corp., 672 F.3d 661, 670 (9th Cir. 2012) (cataloging
injunctive relief routinely obtained in state attorneys general consumer protection actions). In contrast, class action cases focus on monetary recovery.
Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and
Their Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 824 (2010) (finding 89%
of class action settlements included cash relief and 23% of cases included injunctive or declaratory relief).
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statute, the severity of the violations, the willfulness of the
192
conduct, and other factors.
Public compensation is part of but complicates the deterrence rationale of public enforcement. Public compensation obviously provides relief to people adversely affected by the viola193
tor’s conduct. Courts, however, also stress the deterrence
rationale for public compensation because it forces law viola194
tors to forego gains and takes away unfair market advantage.
Underscoring the deterrence rationale of public compensation
is the fluidity between civil penalty and public compensation
recovery in some contexts. Penalties collected in enforcement
actions usually are paid to the general fund of the govern195
ment, but some enforcers are authorized to use penalty funds
196
for public compensation. Conversely, money collected for pub-

192. Colin S. Diver, The Assessment and Mitigation of Civil Money Penalties by Federal Administrative Agencies, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1435 (1979) (describing the varying requirements of 348 federal statutes authorizing civil
penalties); Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An
Introduction, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 321, 358 (2013) (describing complex
CFPB civil penalty authority); Shelden & Gardner, supra note 57, at 388
(state attorneys general civil penalty authority); see also Minzner, supra note
101, at 2127–31 (describing the choices facing government enforcers in seeking
an amount of penalties).
193. A similar intersection of compensatory and deterrence functions exists
in private enforcement, but the balance weights toward compensation. Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM.
L. REV. 1301, 1310 (2008).
194. See, e.g., Eddleman v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 923 F.2d 782, 791 (10th Cir.
1991) (“DOL’s pursuit of debarment and liquidation of back-pay claims was
primarily to prevent unfair competition in the market by companies who pay
substandard wages.”); State v. Master Distribs., 615 P.2d 116, 124–25 (Idaho
1980) (“Only a substantial likelihood that defendants . . . will be subject to
restitutionary orders will deter many with a mind to engage in sharp practices.”).
195. Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement,
127 HARV. L. REV. 853, 864 (2014) (“The default rule under both state and federal law is that the proceeds of public enforcement belong to the public
fisc . . . .”). Some government enforcers are authorized to retain penalty or cost
recoveries to fund enforcement or other agency activity. Id. at 864–76.
196. Winship, supra note 107, at 1118–24 (describing SEC “Fair Funds”
authority). The CFPB has a Civil Penalty Fund which, unlike SEC Fair
Funds, allows CFPB assessed penalties to be distributed in later cases when
the agency is unable to collect ordered public compensation from the enforcement defendant. 12 U.S.C. § 5497(d)(1) (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 1075 (2012). State
attorneys general have successfully argued that civil penalties for UDAP violations can be used to augment public compensation. CashCall, Inc. v.
Morrisey, No. 12-1274, 2014 WL 2404300, at *19 (W. Va. May 30, 2014).
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lic compensation often is directed to a public treasury or cy pres
197
awards if it is not practical to distribute.
2. Discretion in Seeking Remedies
Government enforcers exercise discretion over the balance
of remedies to seek in enforcement actions. The highest-level
choice is the balance between the rigor of injunctive prescriptions to restrain future conduct versus some form of monetary
payment. If a company has ceased operations, an enforcement
action may be focused solely on obtaining a monetary recovery
from corporate officials. When the primary goal is to change the
conduct of a company or industry, an injunction likely will be
the priority. In many cases, the balance between injunctive and
monetary relief will evolve over the course of the enforcement
action.
Whether to seek civil penalties, public compensation or
both as monetary relief for violations also is a discretionary
matter, and different government enforcers have different poli198
cies as to balance of remedies. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has a practice of eschewing public compen199
sation. Agency views of the relative importance of public
compensation shift over time, and the current trend is decided200
ly in favor of more public compensation. The SEC, for example, “long disclaimed any role as an instrument for private individuals to recover money,” but by 2005 had decided to seek
201
the return of money to investors “whenever possible.”

197. 15 U.S.C. § 15e(2) (2012) (stating that state antitrust enforcement recovery for harm to consumers can “be deemed a civil penalty by the court and
deposited with the State as general revenues”); 17 C.F.R. § 201.1102(b) (2012)
(allowing SEC disgorgement to be deposited into U.S. Treasury); Farmer, supra note 92, at 391–400 (noting cy pres awards are common in state antitrust
cases).
198. Enforcement defendants also will have varying preferences as to monetary relief. For instance, they may prefer payment to consumers because it is
tax deductible, unlike a civil penalty.
199. Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 536–39 (observing that the FDA obtains
disgorgement or restitution in enforcement actions but has a practice of distributing the money to the U.S. Treasury rather than victims of the illegal
conduct).
200. Id. at 529 (stating “SEC-based compensation has increased dramatically” after 2002); id. at 534 (stating “FTC-based compensation to victims has
increased tremendously” since the 1970s).
201. Winship, supra note 107, at 1110. The FTC view of public compensation in antitrust enforcement similarly has evolved. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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In a series of enforcement actions against mortgage servicing companies, state attorneys general used their authority to
seek penalties to obtain a multi-billion dollar public compensa202
tion program for loan modifications.
Regardless of the general disposition of the government enforcer toward public compensation, the mix of remedies obtained in an enforcement action remains a case-by-case decision in public enforcement. Banking regulators, for instance,
have settled cases involving illegal practices in account over203
draft charges by imposing only a civil penalty, by administra204
tive order concerning regulatory compliance, or by an order
with all forms of relief—civil penalty, public compensation, and
205
an order requiring operational changes.
3. Discretion in Structuring Public Compensation
The broad discretion of government enforcers usually extends to distribution mechanisms and procedures for public
compensation. In most circumstances, no regulatory scheme
requires specific procedures for public compensation, and thus
the procedures are shaped by the court or agency, or more typically through settlement on a case-by-case basis.
Unlike class actions, notice to consumers typically occurs
after the plan for public compensation is determined. Consumers do not have a right to object to the terms of the distribution.
A key difference in public compensation procedures is
whether the compensation requires the consumer to file a
claim, and if so, the type of claims process. Some public compensation cases involve a distribution of the relief without any
requirement for consumer involvement. The recipients and
amount of public compensation per person is determined based
on the business records of the enforcement defendant. The government enforcer either requires the defendant to provide the
206
compensation, or the enforcement defendant is given credit
202. Totten, supra note 20, at 1639–47.
203. In re Greenbank Greeneville, FDIC-10-802K (Sept. 2, 2011) (order to
pay), https://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/enforcement/2011-09-40.pdf.
204. Appeal of Violation of Federal Trade Commission Act and Material
Supervisory Determinations (First Quarter 2012), OCC, http://www.occ.treas
.gov/topics/dispute-resolution/bank-appeals/summaries/appeal-violations-trade
-q1-2012.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2016).
205. Press Release, OCC, OCC, Woodforest National Bank Enter Agreement To Reimburse Consumers (Oct. 8, 2010), http://www.occ.gov/news
-issuances/news-releases/2010/nr-occ-2010-122.html.
206. See, e.g., Press Release, CFPB, CFPB Orders American Express To
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for refunds or actions to recompense consumers based on crite207
ria identified in a settlement agreement, or the government
enforcer receives a fixed amount for public compensation and
208
has broad discretion to distribute the money. Public compensation occasionally requires no distribution because it is relief
that benefits individuals but does not require the payment of
money, such as when a defendant foregoes the right to collect
209
an alleged debt.
Claim forms are used in cases where the customer must
opt-in to receive the offered relief. Some claims require only
that the consumer file a form to receive the offered relief, while
other claim forms require the consumer to certify that she
meets an eligibility requirement, or to submit proof of eligibility
210
for the relief. An important distinction in claims procedure in
Pay $59.5 Million for Illegal Credit Card Practices (Dec. 23, 2013), http://
www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-orders-american-express-to-pay-59
-5-million-for-illegal-credit-card-practices (announcing settlement of joint enforcement action with OCC and FDIC and describing refund procedure as follows: “If the consumers are still American Express customers, they will receive
a credit to their accounts. If they are no longer an American Express credit
card holder, they will receive checks in the mail. Consumers are not required
to take any action to receive their credit or check.”); see also Velikonja, supra
note 35, at 392 (“Where the defendant is solvent and trustworthy and the victims identifiable without a notice and claims process, the SEC has ordered the
defendant . . . to compensate its victims directly—eliminating the need to create a distribution fund.”).
207. See, e.g., National Mortgage Settlement Summary, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services
-and-commerce/national-mortgage-settlement-summary.aspx (describing $17
billion of relief for certain types of actions, such as mortgage modifications, for
which the mortgage servicer “will receive credit for completing these consumer
relief activities”).
208. See, e.g., Final Order, FTC v. Info. Mgmt. Forum, Civ No. 6:12-cv-986Orl-31 KRS, at 8 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2013) (indicating that over $16.9 million
was to be dispersed under FTC’s direction); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm’n v. Trimble, No. 11-CV-PAB-KMT, 2013 WL 317576, at *10–11 (D.
Colo. Jan. 28, 2013) (awarding more than $878,000 in restitution to investors
to be distributed at discretion of court-appointed monitor).
209. The CFPB, for example, obtained a settlement with the Zenith Education Group in February 2015 to reduce student loan principal balances by 40%
for Corinthian College graduates. Press Release, CFPB, CFPB Secures $480
Million in Debt Relief for Current and Former Corinthian Students (Feb. 3,
2015), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-secures-480-million-in
-debt-relief-for-current-and-former-corinthian-students.
210. Compare Consent Order, In re Ace Cash Express, Inc., 2014-CFPB0008, at 17–18 (July 8, 2014) (appointing a third-party administrator to create
and distribute claims forms for public compensation to payday loan borrowers
with no proof requirements), with Consumer Prot. Div. Office of Atty. Gen. v.
Consumer Pub. Co., 501 A.2d 48, 74 (Md. 1985) (requiring consumers to file a
claim form stating “that they relied on the false impressions created by the
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public compensation arises with regard to whether acceptance
of the relief is made contingent on the consumer executing a release of private claims against the enforcement defendant,
211
which occurs in some cases.
Unlike class actions, judicial review is not always required
in public compensation cases. Settlements in administrative actions generally are not subject to judicial review, but courts
sometimes review enforcement actions filed in a judicial forum,
212
even if a settlement is reached. State attorneys general frequently settle cases prior to filing a lawsuit through use of an
assurance of voluntary compliance, which is a statutory authorization for such settlements and can require judicial approv213
al.
B. BROAD REMEDIAL DISCRETION UNDER STATUTORY
AUTHORITY DISTINGUISHES PUBLIC COMPENSATION FROM CLASS
ACTION REMEDIES
Public and private enforcement of civil law overlap in purpose and consequence. Both types of enforcement deter, and
both compensate people who suffer loss. That public and private enforcement share attributes, however, should not obscure
fundamental differences. Government enforcers have a different job than class action attorneys, and accountability has a
different meaning for public compensation than it does for
monetary recovery in private actions.
1. Differing Origins of Public Enforcement Authority and
Class Action Certification
Public enforcement rests on legislative designation of government entities to exercise broad discretion in enforcing specific statutory schemes. These statutory schemes do not charge
government enforcers with obligations to represent private in214
terests. This point becomes apparent in civil public enforceadvertising” at issue).
211. See infra Part V.B.
212. Winship, supra note 131, at 559 (“Courts have often evaluated whether SEC settlements and distributions are fair, reasonable, and adequate.”).
213. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 407.030 (2015) (requiring assurance subject
to get approval of the court). State attorneys general also commonly jointly file
a complaint and proposed consent judgment, which requires court review and
approval. See, e.g., Consent Judgment, Washington v. Household Int’l, Inc.,
No. 02-2-35630-3 (Wash. Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 2002) (including the complaint of
the Washington Attorney General).
214. Again, state antitrust enforcement actions, under the Clayton Act, are
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ment litigation when the government calls consumers, investors, or employees as witnesses who can testify about the alleged illegal conduct, or the enforcement defendant deposes
these individuals. The government enforcer does not represent
these individuals in the same way as would the individuals’
private counsel, so the defendant is free to obtain testimony
about conversations these individuals have with government
attorneys or investigators, as no attorney-client privilege applies. The fact that government enforcers do not represent the
recipients of public compensation renders unnecessary an inquiry into the adequacy of the purported representation as a
215
constitutional matter.
Government enforcers have authority to define enforcement priorities when implementing statutory schemes. Flexibility in selecting and implementing enforcement remedies is
part of the broad discretion invested by Congress and state legislatures in government enforcers. Part of this discretionary
authority involves considering whether to seek public compensation or not, structure it in one way or another, and balancing
it against other remedies. Statutes authorizing public compensation do not provide for private rights in the pursuit of that
compensation.
In contrast, the class action is a procedural mechanism
that rests on the grievances and claims of the class members.
Class members do not pick the representative of their private
interests in class actions. Accordingly, class actions are certified under civil procedure aggregation rules that invest authority in class counsel and class representatives only if they adequately represent the interests of the class. Notice, opt-out and
judicial review requirements for class actions flow, in part,
from the need for some formal method of apprising class counsel fealty to this principle.
The underlying rationale for public compensation authority
granted in public enforcement, therefore, wholly differs from
the rationale for granting class counsel and class representatives the authority to prosecute a class action. The less rigorous
procedures for public compensation compared to a class action
exceptions because the state is expressly authorized to represent private interests of its citizens and required to comply with procedures designed to afford Due Process protections of those private interests. See supra Part I.B.4.
215. Courts and government enforcers can and do structure public compensation so as to require the recipient to release claims as a condition of obtaining the compensation, which raises issues of adequacy of representation as a
practical matter. See supra note 149 and accompanying text; infra Part V.B.
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make sense because public compensation is pursued or foregone
by decision of the government enforcer. A state attorney general, for example, can decide to settle an enforcement action
with a $50 million penalty and an injunction, even if the government’s complaint sought public compensation as a remedy
and prior settlement discussions included a demand by the
state attorney general for $25 million each in penalties and
public compensation. Counsel and class representatives for a
class action certified based on alleged monetary damages suffered by the class cannot operate similarly in unilaterally deciding to forego any monetary relief for the class in favor of a
payment to the government or reform of sales practices, absent
unusual circumstances.
Contrast this broad discretion to seek and shape relief,
with the criticism that public compensation occurs without effective participation or control by the recipients, against the
stricter requirements for notice and objection rights provided in
class action cases. These notice and objection rights exist because class actions assert the collective claims of class members
and the class case results in preclusion of those claims. Government enforcers who decide to seek public compensation have
no obligations to obtain a certain amount of compensation,
structure the compensation in a particular manner, or involve
the recipients of relief in any way. Some enforcement actions
resulting in public compensation involve close collaboration between the government enforcer and recipients of relief or advocates for those recipients. Recipients in other public compensation cases discover the existence of the enforcement action
when they receive an account credit or a claim form or through
discovering media stories. From the perspective of legislatively
granted authority, there is no difference in the legitimacy of
public compensation in these two situations.
2. Public Compensation Is Part of the Broader Exercise of
Discretion in Civil Law Enforcement
The scholarly critics mostly ignore this difference in the
origin of the authority for public enforcement versus private
aggregate actions. Instead, they offer a functional critique.
They contend that choosing to seek monetary relief for a group
of people effectively puts government enforcers in the same position as class counsel, and thus government enforcers have the
same problems of accountability to and consent from the recipients of relief. So “like class counsel,” they are prone to accept
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inadequate, “quick and easy” settlements, among other prob216
lems.
This argument narrows the scope of the inquiry without
justification. There is no difference between the issues of accountability and consent in public compensation and the same
concerns with other enforcement decisions made by government enforcers. The critics appear to be picking a fight with the
use of one government enforcement remedy, but their position
really attacks a legislative choice to grant broad discretion to
government enforcers.
Take the argument of the critics that packs the most
force—that government enforcers have conflicts of interests
with the potential recipients of public compensation. For sure,
government enforcers have multiple interests to consider in
any enforcement action, and some of these interests will sometimes conflict with some or all compensation recipients. This
observation, however, applies to the full range of enforcement
discretion entrusted to the government enforcer, not just public
compensation. The key for our inquiry is to sort out the conflict
of interest concerns unique to public compensation that would
justify imposing new procedural requirements only on this aspect of public enforcement.
Government enforcers decide which problems within their
purview deserve attention, which cases in those areas to investigate as an enforcement concern, and which cases investigated
will be pursued as an enforcement action. Once a specific case
achieves regulatory attention worthy of enforcement, the government enforcer faces a new set of decisions, which usually includes the scope of conduct to investigate, the investigative
methods, the best forum for the action, what violations of law to
allege, and whom to target (e.g., whether to include corporate
officials as defendants). Then comes the issue of what relief to
seek as to which targets of the action, with the familiar allocation between injunctive relief, penalties, and restitution.
The critique of public compensation starts after all these
decisions have been made, when the government enforcer has
begun to prosecute an enforcement action and determined to
seek consumer, investor, or employee relief as one remedy. The
focus of the critique is on how much compensation was obtained
in the action and to whom it was distributed. These questions
216. Lemos, supra note 7, at 491; see Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 551 (indicating that “agencies may seek quick settlements to resolve embarrassing
missteps in regulatory policy”).
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do not raise any patent concerns about conflicts of interest and
accountability that are absent from the other welter of decisions in the enforcement action. If an individual, advocacy organization, or company lobbies a government enforcer to initiate, or refrain from initiating, an enforcement action against a
particular company or against an industry, one can point to the
conflicting interests of the government enforcer as motivating
217
its decision, to bring an action or demure. The same critique
about conflicting interests can be leveled if a government enforcer decides to sue Company X and not its competitors, or
seeks only injunctive relief and not monetary relief.
Consider examples from the list of specific conflicts of interest that animate the critics. If a regulator becomes captive of
the interests of the regulated entities, the decision to bring an
action or not, or the strength of injunctive relief constraining
future conduct, or total monetary value of the case including
penalties would seem to be more affected by this conflict than
how public compensation is distributed. In the wake of the multi-billion dollar settlement between the DOJ and J.P. Morgan
Chase involving the sale of mortgage securities, a public interest group sued the DOJ for failure to seek judicial review and
reveal information about the settlement, but the focus of the
suit was on the overall relief and penalties assessed rather
218
than the public compensation. The same is true of a state attorney general suing for UDAP violations but mostly concerned
about the loss of jobs of an in-state defendant employer resulting from the enforcement action. The attorney general could
forgo the lawsuit, compromise on the details of injunctive relief,
or abstain from seeking penalties just as easily as she could fail

217. For instance, a “short seller” investor anticipating a drop in the stock
price of Herbalife recently lobbied the FTC and state attorneys general to
bring a UDAP action against the company. Michael Schmidt et al., After Big
Bet, Hedge Fund Pulls the Levers of Power, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/10/business/staking-1-billion-that-herbalife
-will-fail-then-ackman-lobbying-to-bring-it-down.html.
218. Ben Protess, Lawsuit Challenges Government’s $13 Billion Deal with
JPMorgan, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/02/
10/justice-department-sued-over-13-billion-jpmorgan-pact; see also Lisa Gilbert & Brett Naylor, Bank Settlements Need To Reveal More Information, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/08/27/
holding-bankers-accountable/bank-settlements-need-to-reveal-more
-information (arguing that the settlement did not reveal the underlying allegations and thus it was not possible to determine if the DOJ should have pursued criminal prosecutions).
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to aggressively pursue public compensation or structure compensation in a certain form.
Public compensation arguably raises fewer issues of public
accountability than other discretionary enforcement decisions,
even those choices limited only to remedies. An individual or
class can seek relief from inadequate public compensation
219
where such suits are feasible. No alternate private relief is
available for the person disappointed in the injunctive relief
from the enforcement action or the amount of civil penalty paid
220
to the government. We have seen that homeowners can seek
damages for harm caused by a polluter, for example, but they
have no recourse to challenge a remediation plan resulting
221
from a public enforcement action. The fact that decisions of
the government enforcer are subject to comparison with later
private actions may give pause to elected or appointed officials
who want to settle cheaply or distribute the money in service of
unsavory motives. The same is true when courts review the adequacy of public compensation in determining whether to certify a class action. These situations present the possibility that
the government enforcer’s decision on public compensation will
be publicly scrutinized and publicly criticized in the subsequent
private case, a result not likely as to injunctive relief because a
private action challenging the injunction would be precluded.
In short, arguments for procedural reform of public compensation, based on a litany of perceived conflicts of interest or
222
problems of “client monitoring and control,” are arguments
against the unavoidable and routine exercise of discretion in
government civil law enforcement. One could protest the
breadth of discretion afforded to public officials in civil law enforcement, as have advocates for corporate enforcement de223
fendants. But urging class action procedures only as to public
compensation misconstrues the purpose and operation of public
enforcement.

219. See supra Part III.A.
220. See supra Part III.A.3.
221. See supra notes 168–70 and accompanying text.
222. Lemos, supra note 7, at 518–22.
223. See U.S. CHAMBER INST. LEGAL REFORM, UNPRINCIPLED PROSECUTION: ABUSE OF POWER AND PROFITEERING IN THE NEW “LITIGATION SWARM” 3
(2014) (“Exercises of significant government authority should be subject to
checks and balances. Yet enforcement officials have virtually unrestricted discretion in deciding whether to initiate investigations and institute lawsuits,
and in setting the price of settlement.”).
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3. Judicial Recognition of the Importance of Enforcement
Discretion in Rejecting the Class Action Analogy
The differences in authority and function of public and private enforcement explain case law that overwhelmingly rejects
application of the class action analogy to public compensation
in a variety of contexts. Enforcement defendants repeatedly
have attempted to define public compensation as a public form
of a private class action suit to force limits on its use as a remedy. In largely rejecting these arguments, courts articulate the
importance of government enforcer discretion in shaping public
enforcement under authority in statutory schemes. The decisions—of the U.S. Supreme Court in General Telephone and the
California Supreme Court in Pacific Land Research—that government enforcers need not use preclusive class action proce224
dures when seeking public compensation are such cases, and
the rejection of the class action analogy has occurred in other
contexts.
The Lemos article was cited repeatedly in the briefs of
business defendants and industry amici, including in Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., a 2014 U.S. Supreme
Court case holding that a state enforcement action is not converted into a “mass action” under the Class Action Fairness Act
(CAFA) when the state seeks public compensation as a reme225
dy. Enforcement defendants had argued in a series of circuit
cases that state enforcement action became a “disguised class
action” when the state sought public compensation, thus mak224. See supra Part III.A.1.
225. 134 S. Ct. 736 (2014). The Lemos article was also cited in the following
briefs: Brief for Respondents at 58 n.6, Mississippi, 134 S. Ct. 736 (No. 121036), 2013 WL 4769415; Brief for Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers
of America & American Bankers Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 7 n.3, Mississippi, 134 S. Ct. 736 (No. 12-1036), 2013 WL
4875113; Brief of DRI—The Voice of the Defense Bar as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 10–11, Mississippi, 134 S. Ct. 736 (No. 12-1036), 2013
WL 4829338; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 27–33, AU Optronics
Corp. v. South Carolina, 134 S. Ct. 999 (2014) (No. 12-911), 2013 WL 287738
(citing Lemos multiple times). The Lemos article was cited in numerous industry amici briefs in support of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court in State v.
Exxon Mobil Corp., 126 A.3d 266 (N.H. 2015), including for the proposition
that the prevailing view of courts is that public compensation results in preclusion of later private claims. See Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States of America & Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of
America as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 9, Exxon, 126 A.3d 266
(No. 15-933), 2016 WL 704923; Brief International Association of Defense
Counsel as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 11, Exxon, 126 A.3d 266
(No. 15-933), 2016 WL 738178.
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ing state enforcement actions removable under CAFA. Three
of four circuits rejected this argument prior to the Supreme
Court similarly resolving the issue. The Ninth Circuit held that
“Nevada’s sovereign interest in protecting its citizens and economy from deceptive mortgage practices is not diminished mere227
ly because it has tacked on a claim for restitution.” Prior to
the enactment of CAFA, enforcement defendants removed cases
by state attorneys general seeking public compensation to federal court by asserting that the potential recipients of relief
were the real parties in interest and thus diversity jurisdiction
authorized removal. Courts remanded these actions to state
court because public compensation was one remedy sought in
228
an enforcement case with a broader public purpose.
226. LG Display Co. v. Madigan, 665 F.3d 768, 770 (7th Cir. 2011) (stating
that defendants characterized state attorney general suits as a “disguised
class action”). CAFA allows for removal to federal court of “mass actions,”
which CAFA defines as “monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons . . .
proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve
common questions of law or fact.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) (2012). Four
federal circuits—the Second, Fourth, Seventh and Ninth—rejected the argument that public compensation cases were mass actions removable to federal
court under CAFA based on a review of the whole complaint. Purdue Pharma
L.P. v. Kentucky, 704 F.3d 208, 219 (2d Cir. 2013); AU Optronics v. South
Carolina, 699 F.3d 385, 394 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 999 (2014);
Nevada v. Bank of Am. Corp., 672 F.3d 661, 670 (9th Cir. 2012); LG Display,
665 F.3d at 773–74. The Fifth Circuit held that a state public enforcement action could be reviewed for each specific claim and type of relief for CAFA purposes, and an action seeking public compensation was removable under CAFA.
Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 701 F.3d 796 (5th Cir. 2012),
rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 736 (2014). The Court reversed the Fifth Circuit without directly engaging the circuit split regarding the “whole complaint” versus “claim
specific” approach. See Mississippi, 134 S. Ct. at 746; Georgene Vairo, Is the
Class Action Really Dead? Is That Good or Bad for Class Members?, 64 EMORY
L.J. 477, 521–29 (2014) (describing the CAFA litigation in state attorney general cases).
227. Nevada, 672 F.3d at 671.
228. New York v. Gen. Motors Corp., 547 F. Supp. 703, 706–07 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (“This conclusion is not altered by the State’s decision to seek
restitutionary relief and damages on behalf of those who allegedly have been
defrauded by GM. Recovery of damages for aggrieved consumers is but one aspect of the case.”); accord Missouri ex rel. Webster v. Best Buy Co., 715 F.
Supp. 1455, 1457 (E.D. Mo. 1989); Illinois ex rel. Scott v. Hunt Int’l Res. Corp.,
481 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (rejecting defendant’s argument that “the
‘private’ relief of restitution and damages on behalf of a class of land purchasers is separate and independent from the claim for ‘public’ relief in the form of
an injunction and civil penalties sought by the Attorney General”); see also
People ex rel. Hartigan v. Lann, 587 N.E.2d 521, 523–25 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)
(rejecting the argument that the Illinois Attorney General must represent individual consumers for purposes of discovery requests because consumers
were real parties in interest).
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New York state courts rejected an argument by former AIG
officials that federal securities law governing private class action suits applies to state enforcement action because the New
York Attorney General was acting as “a de facto representative” of stockholders in bringing an enforcement action seeking
229
public compensation. The court emphasized the distinction
between public and private actions in describing why the Attorney General was not representing the stockholders:
[A]fter years of joint federal and state investigation, the Attorney
General exercised the discretion of his office to bring this enforcement
action . . . to protect the citizens of this State and the integrity of the
securities marketplace in New York, to enjoin allegedly fraudulent
practices, and to direct restitution and damages to deter future simi230
lar misconduct.

For similar reasons, federal courts have held that public
compensation in state UDAP enforcement cases is to “effectuate public policy” rather than “adjudicate private rights,” and
thus seeking public compensation falls within the police and
231
regulatory exceptions in bankruptcy. In finding that public
compensation is “fundamentally law enforcement,” the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the character of an enforcement action
232
“is not affected by the choice of restitution as a remedy.”
229. People ex rel. Cuomo v. Greenberg, 946 N.Y.S.2d 1, 6 (App. Div. 2012).
A parallel class later settled and the Attorney General agreed on appeal to the
highest state court that public compensation in the form of damages was not
possible in the face of the class settlement and in light of prior New York precedent. People ex rel. Cuomo v. Greenberg, 994 N.E.2d 838, 840–41 (N.Y. 2013).
230. Cuomo, 946 N.Y.S.2d at 6. The Washington Supreme Court also upheld the constitutionality of the express statutory authority of its Attorney
General for public compensation over an objection that “obtaining money or
property restoration by the Attorney General for private parties who were
complaining witnesses would be in effect having the Attorney General directly
representing those persons.” State v. Ralph Williams’ N.W. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 510 P.2d 233, 241 (Wash. 1973).
231. City of San Francisco v. PG & E Corp., 433 F.3d 1115, 1124 (9th Cir.
2006) (holding that there was no right of removal because the police and regulatory exemption applies to a claim by California state and local authorities for
restitution from a bankrupt utility); In re First All. Mortg. Co., 263 B.R. 99,
109–15 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001) (finding an automatic stay to be inapplicable to
a claim by Massachusetts Attorney General seeking restitution for subprime
mortgage borrowers); In re Luskin’s, Inc., 213 B.R. 107, 108 (D. Md. 1997)
(finding an automatic stay inapplicable to a claim by Maryland Attorney General seeking restitution for deceptive advertising by a retailer). In In re First
Alliance Mortgage Co., the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel discussed an earlier, contrary decision and found that it was not supportable
based on later case law development. 263 B.R. at 111–12. This Panel also noted cases reaching a contrary result when restitution was victim-specific rather
than public compensation. Id. at 112–13.
232. City of San Francisco, 433 F.3d at 1126.
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Some government enforcers, notably the EEOC, regularly
obtain victim-specific relief rather than public compensation for
a numerous group. In victim-specific suits, the EEOC seeks relief for one employee or a small number of identified individu233
als. These suits draw government enforcers as close as possible to representing private interests. Yet even in this situation,
courts usually draw the line between public enforcement and
private interests.
The U.S. Supreme Court rendered such a decision when
the EEOC sued Waffle House, Inc. for violations of the Ameri234
cans with Disabilities Act as to a single employee. The Court
rejected an attempt by Waffle House to compel the EEOC to
arbitrate its claim under the conditions of a pre-dispute arbitration clause in the contract between the employee and the
235
company. The Court articulated the importance of understanding the requested EEOC relief as part of its exercise of
discretion under a public enforcement scheme:
[W]henever the EEOC chooses from among the many charges filed
each year to bring an enforcement action in a particular case, the
agency may be seeking to vindicate a public interest, not simply provide make-whole relief for the employee, even when it pursues entirely victim-specific relief. To hold otherwise would undermine the detailed enforcement scheme created by Congress simply to give greater
effect to an agreement between private parties that does not even
236
contemplate the EEOC’s statutory function.

State courts have similarly refused to enforce arbitration
clauses in enforcement actions brought by state attorneys gen237
eral and state regulators for the same reasons. These deci233. Morrison, supra note 38, at 121 (indicating the EEOC may bring a
pattern and practice case, or it “may also bring suit based on an aggrieved individual or individuals’ charge of discrimination”). Victim-specific compensation occurs in a variety of other types of enforcement actions, including enforcers that typically obtain public compensation. See, e.g., State ex rel. Celebrezze
v. Eastside Nissan, Inc., No. 87CV-10-6460, 1987 WL 421777, at *3 (Ohio Ct.
Com. Pl. Oct. 13, 1987) (detailing the UDAP enforcement action by Ohio Attorney General resulting in payments to three identified car buyers). Other
enforcers are smaller regulatory entities like occupational licensing entities.
See Bitter v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, No. 02-12-00197-CV, 2014 WL
1999315 (Tex. App. May 15, 2014) (providing restitution to specific victims of
attorney misconduct).
234. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
235. Id. at 293–95.
236. Id. at 296.
237. Rent-A-Ctr., Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 843 N.W.2d 727, 740–
41 (Iowa 2014) (refusing to compel arbitration in civil rights employment enforcement action and noting similar state appellate court holdings in New
York and Massachusetts); State ex rel. Hatch v. Cross Country Bank, Inc., 703
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sions flip on its head the assertion by critics that public compensation is essentially a government form of class action. Rather, statutory schemes permitting government enforcers to
seek public compensation at their discretion without requiring
use of class action procedures reflect a legislative decision that
public compensation should not be governed by norms underlying class action suits. Analogizing or equating class action
monetary recovery and public compensation creates misunderstanding as to the reasons that courts, legislators, and government enforcers act as they have in structuring public compensation in civil law enforcement.
C. CLASS ACTION PROCEDURES ARE AN ILL FIT FOR PUBLIC
COMPENSATION IN VARYING ENFORCEMENT ENVIRONMENTS
The argument to this point has been that the use of flexible, less onerous procedures for public compensation neither
raises constitutional concerns nor results in problems of accountability and consent that have any meaning in the context
of public enforcement. But what about applying class action
procedures for practical policy reasons? Perhaps rigorous procedural requirements for public compensation would make it
fairer and more responsive to the needs of recipients. But any
theoretical appeal of this idea quickly dissolves when considering the ill fit and negative consequences of imposing more onerous procedures on public compensation as it occurs under
varying statutory schemes and in varying enforcement environments. One can imagine a case for imposing class action
procedures in a specifically identified enforcement context. A
broad-brush comparison of class actions and public compensation, however, does little to identify when such procedures are
warranted, if ever. Although not an exhaustive list, this subpart looks at the following four variations in public compensation that undermine a call for broad imposition of costly procedures: differing proof requirements, differing importance of
N.W.2d 562, 574–75 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (refusing to compel arbitration in a
case brought by state attorney general under common law parens and statutory injunctive authority for tort violations in debt collection); People ex rel.
Cuomo v. Coventry First LLC, 915 N.E.2d 616, 619 (N.Y. 2009) (indicating
that arbitration agreements between insurance entities did not require New
York Attorney General to arbitrate claims against insurer); Taylor v. Ernst &
Young LLP, 958 N.E.2d 1203, 1211 (Ohio 2011) (refusing to compel arbitration
by the state superintendent of insurance in his “public-protection role”). But
see Ropp v. 1717 Capital Mgmt. Co., No. CIV.A. 02-1701-KAJ, 2004 WL 93945,
at *2 (D. Del. Jan. 14, 2004) (stating that an arbitration clause is enforceable
when state securities commissioner seeks victim-specific relief).
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non-monetary factors in compensation, the fact that many public compensation schemes make recipients whole, and the adverse impact on recipients of public compensation that will follow added procedural costs.
First, unlike private class actions, calculation of public
compensation often is not based on the loss of the consumer,
investor, or employee, so there is less or no reason to impose
procedures designed to ensure the consent of the recipient.
Government enforcers usually seek restitution or disgorgement
or another form of equitable relief. Private actions typically
seek damages. The proof required, the measure of loss or recovery, and the definition of success can differ in public compensation and private actions. Many enforcement actions, including
most FTC, SEC, and CFTC cases, are based on a restitution or
disgorgement theory that measures public compensation by the
illegal gain to the defendant rather than an estimate of loss to
238
the consumer or investor. And the amount of public compensation can be derived in an imprecise manner fitting a deterrence rationale, but not appropriate for proof in a damages
239
case.
In some cases, the source of funds for public compensation
is wholly removed from the distribution of funds. The CFPB authorizing statute establishes a Civil Penalty Fund that allows
the agency to use money obtained in a prior enforcement action
240
to fund public compensation in a later enforcement action.
Other government enforcers have authority to deploy civil penalty recoveries for public compensation, even though such penalties are derived from different considerations than consumer
241
loss. These sorts of public compensation recoveries are alien
to a private action for damages or other monetary relief, and
thus the justification for imposing private class action procedures has no application in such actions.
238. FTC v. Verity Int’l, Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 67 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining
that in FTC cases, “appropriate measure for restitution is the benefit unjustly
received by the defendants”); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Am.
Metals Exch. Corp., 991 F.2d 71, 78 (3d Cir. 1993) (following an approach regarding compensation similar to the CFTC cases). The Pennsylvania State Securities Regulator’s authority to obtain restitution and disgorgement is a
sharp example of this distinction. However, it can seek damages only when
“enforcement of the rights of such persons by private civil action, whether by
class action or otherwise, would be so burdensome or expensive as to be impractical.” 70 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1-509 (West 2014).
239. See supra note 64.
240. See supra note 196.
241. See, e.g., supra note 196.
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Second, government enforcers have discretion to consider
numerous factors other than the amount or distribution scheme
for recovery. For example, timeliness of relief can be one of the
primary factors in shaping public compensation. The state attorney general enforcement actions during the foreclosure crisis
occurred in a situation where the quantity of relief to distressed
borrowers needed to be balanced against the need for relief
while homeowners were still in possession of their homes. Class
action procedures would attenuate the process and prevent
swifter public enforcement remedies when necessary.
Third, a substantial amount of public compensation fully
compensates the recipients of the relief. Even though securities
regulators have been heavily criticized for inadequate distributions, the study of SEC actions by Urska Velikonja identified
over fifty cases, almost twenty-five percent of the total cases
evaluated, in which SEC public compensation made claimants
whole or appeared to do so, or provided “very close” to full com242
pensation of loss. Empirical study is needed in other areas to
determine exactly what percentage of public compensation
achieves full compensation, but anecdotal evidence is easy to
find in almost all relevant regulatory areas. The seminal Porter
case involved full compensation for the tenants who overpaid
rent, and many of the consumer cases previously described fully returned the amount expended by all consumers who were
243
charged for a good or service. Wholly compensating an entire
group alleviates any concerns about the adequacy or fairness of
the distribution.
Fourth, public compensation is less costly in its current
form. Class action notice, objection, and review procedures
would add expense and impose case supervision burdens. These
costs could be substantial relative to the amount of recovery in
small-dollar actions, which occur in many consumer finance
cases. Whether in response to these costs or to the administrative burdens of implementing procedures, government enforc242. Velikonja, supra note 35, at 363–64.
243. See, e.g., CFPB, supra note 6 (reporting that credit card add-on cases
by CFPB returned full cost of product); see also In re Lorazepam &
Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 205 F.R.D. 369, 402–03 (D.D.C. 2002) (providing
full relief to more than 244,000 buyers of medication); State ex rel. Humphrey
v. Alpine Air Prods., Inc., 490 N.W.2d 888, 896 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (upholding award of full cost of air purifying units as restitution); State ex rel.
McGraw v. Imperial Mktg., 506 S.E.2d 799, 811 (W. Va. 1998) (granting full
refund without requiring return of product with “ambiguous” value); infra
note 247 (listing cases with full relief).
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ers have the discretion to simply forego public compensation in
favor of civil penalties, and likely would make this substitution
in many small-dollar cases. Any substitution of penalties for
public compensation will be at the expense of private interests
in compensation when a class action is not feasible and the
244
small-dollar loss makes individual cases impractical.
Public enforcement actions operate on different premises
and with different legal authority than class actions. Not surprisingly, importing class procedures into a public enforcement
context would needlessly impose costs and discourage government enforcer use of a valuable tool.
V. WHEN PUBLIC COMPENSATION CONFLICTS WITH
PRIVATE RIGHTS
The analogy between public compensation and class actions neither explains how legislatures and courts have structured public compensation, nor illuminates consequential conflicts between private rights and public compensation, nor
supports the recommendation that class procedures should apply when enforcers seek public compensation. This Part turns
the problem around by identifying categories of cases where
public compensation conflicts with later assertion of private
rights and asks whether these conflicts have adverse real-world
impacts on the assertion of private rights. Finding some of these conflicts to be of consequence and avoidable, this Part suggests targeted law reform proposals to restore a proper balance
with public enforcement objectives when appropriate.
Government enforcers and courts limit private rights following public compensation, legally or as a practical matter, in
245
two circumstances. We have already seen the first set of cas244. A complete analysis of the costs and disadvantages of class action procedures for public enforcement is not possible here, but it is doubtful whether
such procedures would be appropriate and effective in public compensation
even if there were reasons for constraining the current practice of public compensation. As Deborah Hensler suggests in reviewing the proposal by Lemos
for stricter judicial review of public compensation, “[t]he theoretically attractive procedural solution, authorizing judges to conduct a case-by-case inquiry
into an elected official’s ability to represent faithfully the interest of class
members is fraught with dangers, both practical and political.” Deborah R.
Hensler, Goldilocks and the Class Action, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 56, 59 (2012).
245. This Part does not address situations where private rights are limited
by legislative choice to make public enforcement the exclusive or preemptive
means of enforcement. Some statutory rights are restricted to public enforcement. For example, state UDAP laws almost universally contain a private
right of action, CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 55, § 12.2.1, but federal UDAP
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es—where courts refuse to certify a class action because a class
would not be a superior adjudicative mechanism in light of the
public compensation. The second category of cases is public enforcement settlements predicated on a release of claims by the
recipient of public compensation.
A. JUDICIAL DENIAL OF CLASS CERTIFICATION
The existence of a government enforcement action can result in a court refusing to certify a class action as a “superior”
method of adjudication due to public compensation, although
246
such cases are not frequent. In theory and operation, judicial
denials of class certification based on a completed government
enforcement action do not typically present a conflict between
laws enforced by the FTC and the CFPB provide exclusively for public enforcement. SHELDON ET AL., supra note 18, § 3.8 (stating there is no private
right of action under CFPB UDAAP authority); Dee Pridgen, Wrecking Ball
Disguised as Law Reform: ALEC’s Model Act on Private Enforcement of Consumer Protection Statutes, 39 N.Y.U REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 279, 282 (2015)
(“The FTC Act itself has never featured a private right of action.”). Other statutes authorize public enforcement of the entire statutory scheme and provide
only for private enforcement of specified types of violations. See, e.g., 7 FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYERS EDITION § 15:67 (Mar. 2016) (identifying which requirements of Real Estate Settlement and Procedures Act have a private right
of action). A few statutory schemes include both public and private enforcement rights, but provide that private enforcement cannot occur when the government enforcer acts. An EEOC action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) “terminate(s)” an individual’s private right of action. 29
U.S.C.A. § 626(c)(1) (2012). See generally David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies
as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616 (2013) (discussing various forms
of public oversight or displacement of private rights of action). Nor does this
Part examine situations in which practical conflicts occur between parallel
public and private actions, such as when a defunct defendant has limited resources to allocate between the two actions, which is a problem of appropriate
use of discretion by the government enforcer to efficiently coordinate parallel
actions.
246. Steven Malech & Seth Huttner, What Is Superiority? The Role of
Completed, Pending, and Anticipated Government Activity in Certifying a
Class Action, 9 ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 1 (2010) (noting “surprisingly few cases”
adjudicating superiority of a government action to a class action and describing only a handful of such cases involving public compensation); Steven B.
Malech & Robert E. Koosa, Government Action and the Superiority Requirement: A Potential Bar to Private Class Action Lawsuits, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1419 (2005) (explaining that only “approximately forty” class certification
denials occurred from the early 1970s through the mid-2000s as a result of a
court finding any form of government action the superior method of adjudication). Not all courts take the position that public compensation is relevant to
the superiority determination. See Amalgamated Workers Union v. Hess Oil
Virgin Islands Corp., 478 F.2d 540, 543 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding that Rule 23
“was not intended to weigh the superiority of a class action against possible
administrative relief” by state labor commissioners).
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public compensation and private rights, but class certification
denial is improper when the government action is not completed and when the rationale for denying certification is based on
enhancing the bargaining leverage of the government enforcer.
1. Class Certification Review Appropriately Harmonizes
Private Rights and Completed Public Compensation
Denying class certification after public compensation is
complete, or after the terms of public compensation are determined, impairs private rights only when one of two conditions
exist: (1) individuals in the putative class were excluded from
receiving public compensation, or (2) recipients of public compensation received less than full compensation and a class action could effectively remedy this failure. Courts have appropriately denied class certification following completed public
compensation when neither of these conditions existed because
there was no obtainable relief remaining for the class members.
For instance, a state court denied class certification where a
state securities regulator settled litigation by requiring the new
owner of a group of cemeteries to assume all contractual obligations breached by the prior owner, including “honor all preneed contracts, and advance over $14,800,000 to trusts” to en247
sure performance of contracts. Conversely, courts have certified a class where the public compensation was not comprehensive and complete, allowing the class to obtain additional relief
248
for their injuries. These outcomes effectively harmonize public compensation and private rights.
A few courts have denied class certification following completed public compensation that did not provide exhaustive re247. Farno v. Ansure Mortuaries, LLC, 953 N.E.2d 1253, 1268 (Ind. App.
2011); see also Wechsler v. Se. Properties, Inc., 63 F.R.D. 13, 16–17 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), aff’d, 506 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974) (discussing the state Attorney General
settlement provided relief to investors in putative class that would “make
them whole”); Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., Inc., 167 F.R.D. 40,
46 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (stating that public compensation obtained by state Attorney General and insurance commissioner “covers all members of the proposed class . . . and provides full co-pay relief on all but de minimis claims”).
248. See, e.g., In re Conseco Life Ins. Co. LifeTrend Ins. Sales & Mktg.
Litig., 270 F.R.D. 521, 533 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (certifying a class after a state
regulator settlement with public compensation because the insureds “may be
entitled to other relief through this class action”); Gouldd v. Lowrance, No. 0797-0401-CV, 1998 WL 526489 at *7 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) (certifying class alleging illegal pyramid scheme following enforcement action because the Texas
Attorney General settlement “merely requires Equinox to renotify a certain
portion of its Texas distributors . . . about its refund policy”).
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lief. These cases constitute a situation, albeit uncommon, where
public compensation meaningfully impinges on private rights.
The question is what sort of procedure best protects private
rights against the alleged conflicts of interest between the government enforcer and the putative class. Compare an imagined
scheme of class action procedures in public compensation cases,
as advocated by scholars critical of public compensation, with
the current procedure of deciding this matter on a class certification motion.
Judicial review of each public compensation settlement
akin to class action procedure would mean a hearing at which
the opposing parties in the enforcement action maintain a
shared interest in obtaining judicial review of a negotiated restitution plan. The adequacy of the public compensation program would be evaluated as part of an uncontested motion for
which both parties have strong incentives to contend that the
settlement is adequate. It is unclear how such a costly review
would help consumers with a viable class claim obtain appropriate relief if the settlement could have better protected their
interests. Use of this procedure likely would increase the
chance of certification denial in a subsequent class action because the existence of notice and review procedures would be
an argument in favor of finding public compensation superior
to private aggregate litigation.
In contrast, in a class certification motion, counsel for the
putative class surely will point out any private interests that
were not adequately represented in the design of the public
compensation. If the government enforcer has conflicts of interest or its restitution program reflects bias by public officials, it
is difficult to imagine a better and more motivated advocate
than putative class counsel for discovering and articulating
those concerns in the certification stage of the proceeding. For
example, in one of the cases denying class certification due to
the existence of public compensation, the court considered
whether reputational concerns of state officials “may place public attorneys in a situation analogous to private counsel who
hope to win large fee awards,” which is one of the conflicts of
249
interest of concern to scholarly critics. A class certification
motion would seem to be an ideal forum for effectuating the

249. Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 167 F.R.D. 40, 45 (E.D. Mich.
1996) (quoting Oswald v. Gen. Motors Corp., 549 F.2d 1106, 1125 (7th Cir.
1979)).
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“hard look” judicial review sought by the critics of public compensation to remedy concerns of representational adequacy.
In two particular circumstances, however, judicial reasoning for denial of class certification should be reconsidered.
First, when the public enforcement action is pending rather
than completed, class certification should not be denied on this
basis, except when the public action involves state antitrust enforcement under the Clayton Act. Second, courts should not
consider whether certifying a class action would interfere with
the bargaining position of a government enforcer.
2. Pending Public Enforcement and Class Certification
Some courts have cited a pending rather than completed
public enforcement action as a basis for denying class certifica250
tion. Several of these cases involve state antitrust enforcement under the Clayton Act. Courts in these antitrust cases
have appropriately deferred to the state enforcement action because the statutory scheme under the Clayton Act puts state
enforcer damage claims in direct conflict with the class, and
Congress clearly intended for the government action to take
251
precedence.
In cases other than state antitrust actions, courts should
not deny class certification solely due to a pending parallel government action. The same reasons that lead courts to reject efforts to hamper government enforcement by equating public
compensation with class action relief should apply in reverse
when considering whether to certify a class in the face of a
pending government action. Government enforcers have discretion to not seek or to bargain away the size of public compensation in service of other enforcement objectives, so there should
be no presumption that the outcome of the public action will
252
constitute adequate relief for a putative class. One option
available to courts in this situation is to stay the determination
250. Malech & Huttner, supra note 246, at 7–10.
251. Farmer, supra note 92, at 387–89 (collecting and describing cases).
252. Courts also have cited the potential for public compensation from a
public action not yet filed at the time of the class certification motion, although this reasoning has not been used as a primary justification for denying
class certification. Malech & Huttner, supra note 246, at 9–10 (collecting cases
and concluding that “no case has yet held that an anticipated or potential suit
should be a dispositive factor in precluding certification”). Courts should not
take this approach because the rationale for not deferring to pending government actions applies with even more force to anticipated but not extant government enforcement.
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of class certification until the completion of the public case,
thus allowing comparison of the actual public compensation
253
with the claims of the putative class. Or similarly, courts can
certify the class and hear a decertification motion if the public
254
enforcement action resolves with public compensation.
3. Denying Class Certification in Deference to Public
Enforcement
Courts also deny certification when allowing the class to
proceed would impair the bargaining position of government
enforcers seeking to settle an enforcement action. In Thornton
255
v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., plaintiffs sought
certification of a class of Ohio residents who did not file a claim
with State Farm under a multistate attorneys general settlement. In finding that the class was not a superior method of adjudication, the federal district court observed:
[I]f courts consistently allow parallel or subsequent class actions in
spite of state action, the state’s ability to obtain the best settlement
for its residents may be impacted, since the accused may not wish to
settle with the state only to have the state settlement operate as a
256
floor on liability or otherwise be used against it.

Enforcement defendants may well be more likely to settle
with government enforcers for public compensation if that relief
prevents certification of a coattail class action, but that is not a
valid reason to deny certification. If government enforcers do
not represent private interests, they should not gain bargaining
leverage at the expense of a putative class action by bargaining
away the interests of the class. This same rationale applies to

253. Belfiore v. Procter & Gamble Co., 311 F.R.D. 29, 39 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5,
2015). The federal district court also took this approach in Wechsler v. Southeastern Properties, Inc., 63 F.R.D. 13, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
254. Bryan v. Amrep Corp., 429 F. Supp. 313, 318–19 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (“The
possibility that the FTC may at some future time secure refunds for the class
is not an adequate reason to deny a class determination in this case, which
seeks present and independent relief. If the FTC proceeding should ever assure the rights of the parties, defendants may apply for a stay of this action or
for other appropriate relief.”).
255. No. 1:06-cv-00018, 2006 WL 3359482 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 17, 2006); see
also Kamm v. Cal. City Dev. Co., 509 F.2d 205, 212 (9th Cir. 1975) (discussing
whether a class would “possibly to some extent negate the work on the state
level” is a factor in determining superiority); In re Beacon Assocs. Litig., 2012
WL 1569827, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2012) (discussing cases in which “it is
not simply the existence of the parallel government action but the threat that
certification of the Rule 23(b)(3) class poses to the success or enforcement of
the government action that led courts to deny certification”).
256. Thornton, 2006 WL 3359482, at *3.

2374

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[100:2313

the other situation in which public compensation conflicts with
private rights, which is opt-in public compensation.
B. OPT-IN PUBLIC COMPENSATION THROUGH REQUIRED
RELEASE SETTLEMENTS
Government enforcers sometimes settle cases by making
public compensation contingent on the recipient releasing
257
A release reclaims against the enforcement defendant.
quirement converts public compensation into an opt-in class, as
258
exists in some mass employment claims, with the government
enforcer in the position of class counsel. This circumstance calls
into question the separation of public and private enforcement
because the government enforcer requires the potential recipient of relief to make a choice between public relief and a private right to sue. Forcing this choice breaches the line between
public enforcement and private rights and thus makes appropriate an inquiry into the adequacy of the government as rep259
resentative of the recipients of public compensation. This
subpart argues that such settlements should be discouraged
and suggests reforms to public compensation to achieve this result.
1. Required Releases and Private Rights
Unlike the unfounded apprehension over public compensation precluding later assertion of private rights, required release settlements necessitate an affirmative decision by the recipient to accept an offered bargain at the price of the release.
The predicate question, therefore, is whether a voluntary relin257. This subpart concerns only cases in which a determined amount of
money or other relief is conditioned on a release. Some enforcement cases settle by an agreement to allow claimants an opportunity to present their individual cases for consideration by a neutral or the government enforcer, which
does not present the same concerns as conditioning a share of group relief.
258. 29 U.S.C. § 216 (2012) (providing opt-in procedure in certain wage underpayment cases).
259. In some cases, the national mortgage settlement between state attorneys general and the five largest mortgage servicing banks being a significant
example, the government enforcer will expressly state that private claims are
not within the scope of the release as a precaution against later arguments
that public compensation has preclusive effect. Wells Fargo, which was one of
the settling banks in the national mortgage settlement, nonetheless argued
that the South Carolina Attorney General’s participation in the settlement
had preclusive effect on a later assertion of a private claim by a South Carolina homeowner. The district court dismissed the argument as “disingenuous.”
Harlin v. Wells Fargo Bank NA, No. 3:13-cv-02719 (D.S.C. June 16, 2014).
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quishment of rights by recipients of public compensation raises
any concern about the relationship between public compensation and private rights. Indeed, Lemos argues that required release settlements are one means of affording the procedural
260
protections she deems required by Due Process.
A voluntary and affirmative exchange of a release for compensation does not obviate questions about the representational adequacy of government enforcers for three reasons. First,
the release option arrives with the government enforcer’s implicit encouragement to accept. The credibility of public sanction of the offer gives urgency to ensuring that the relief is adequate compared to the consequence of a release of claims. In
fact, some evidence exists that participation rates in public settlements can be substantially higher than in class action cases
261
requiring filed claims.
Second, there is an asymmetry between the total loss of
rights resulting from a required release settlement and the opportunity for public cure of inadequate relief resulting from a
class action settlement. A release accompanying public compensation extinguishes the claim of the person executing the
release, and also may make it more difficult to certify a class
262
only of people not executing the release. Government enforcers, however, have options for curing inadequate class settlements. Courts generally find no preclusive effect for public
compensation sought subsequent to a final judgment in a pri263
vate action, so in most cases government enforcers can simply
260. Lemos, supra note 7, at 547.
261. Class actions often have participation of less than five percent, even in
opt-out cases where the potential recipient’s claims will be released regardless
of participation in the class settlement. Gail Hillebrand & Daniel Torrence,
Claims Procedures in Large Consumer Class Actions and Equitable Distribution of Benefits, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 747, 751–54 (1988). In contrast, public compensation settlements often have much higher participation rates. See,
e.g., Thornton, 2006 WL 3359482, at *1 (approximately thirty-nine percent acceptance rate).
262. See, e.g., Thornton, 2006 WL 3359482 (refusing to certify a class even
though more than half of the class did not opt-in to public compensation).
263. EEOC v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 383 F.3d 1280, 1293 (11th Cir. 2004)
(reversing district court holding that EEOC precluded in seeking monetary
relief in racial discrimination pattern and practice case involving over 200
employees by prior private suit joining thirty-six private plaintiffs and stating
“it is so unusual to find privity between a governmental agency and private
plaintiffs because governmental agencies have statutory duties, responsibilities, and interests that are far broader than the discrete interests of a private
party”); Herman v. S.C. Nat’l Bank, 140 F.3d 1413 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding
that Secretary of Labor could pursue ERISA action seeking equitable relief
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proceed in the face of a prior class result. Even when a prior
private judgment is considered preclusive, government enforcers have the threat of civil penalties and other remedies as leverage to obtain public compensation in settlements. A recent
$60-million settlement in a case brought by DOJ and FDIC
against Sallie Mae and affiliated entities for alleged violations
of laws protecting active duty military personnel with student
loan debt, for example, provided that public compensation was
owed to service members even if the enforcement defendants
had earlier obtained a release of claims by the service mem264
ber. Because public enforcement can cure inadequate relief in
private enforcement, but private enforcement cannot resolve
inadequate public compensation in required release settlements, the adequacy of government enforcer representation in
such settlements is a relevant concern.
Third, government enforcers sometimes are not well positioned to protect the rights of individual recipients who may
have losses substantial enough to make an individual claim or
defense feasible, yet who waive the right to that claim by accepting public compensation. The extent of harm may not have
been apparent to the recipient at the time he signs the release,
either because the amount of the loss is not apparent or the loss
has not occurred.
A 2005 $40-million settlement between forty-nine state attorneys general and State Farm offers an example of this prob265
lem. Almost all states require that an automobile title carry a
including restitution despite court-approved class action settlement); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Commercial Hedge Servs., Inc., 422 F.
Supp. 2d 1057, 1061 (D. Neb. 2006) (rejecting preclusion of CFTC claim for
restitution where investors had executed releases in private settlements because public compensation serves “distinct deterrence functions”). Compare
FTC v. AMREP Corp., 705 F. Supp. 119, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding that a
prior class action precludes FTC from seeking restitution but not other relief),
with FTC v. QT, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 2d 908, 970 (N.D. Ill. 2006) amended on reconsideration in part, 472 F. Supp. 2d 990 (N.D. Ill. 2007), aff’d, 512 F.3d 858
(7th Cir. 2008) (allowing FTC to seek restitution despite adverse trial result in
prior class action and holding that FTC and class members are not in privity).
But see People ex rel. Spitzer v. Applied Card Sys., Inc., 894 N.E.2d 1, 11–15
(N.Y. 2008) (holding the New York Attorney General was precluded from seeking restitution but not disgorgement following class action settlement).
264. Consent Order, United States v. Sallie Mae, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-00600LPS, ¶ 29 (D. Del. May 13, 2014).
265. Press Release, Iowa Attorney Gen., States Reach Agreement with
State Farm Insurance that Will Result in $40 Million to Consumers (Jan. 10,
2005), http://www.iowaattorneygeneral.gov/newsroom/states-reach-agreement
-with-state-farm-insurance-that-will-result-in-40-million-to-consumers.
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“salvage” brand after it has been in an accident that results in
loss of a high percentage of the value of the vehicle. The case
involved State Farm’s failure to obtain branded titles when
purchasing and then reselling salvage vehicles following accidents involving their insureds. The settlement paid about $800
to $1850 per purchaser of an improperly titled car, but the car
owners were required to sign an unqualified release of claims
266
against the insurer. Public attorneys experienced in pursuing
public law enforcement claims may have little or no experience
representing auto buyers in salvage title cases, and thus might
not be cognizant of all the implications of the release. It is reasonable to assume that driving a salvaged vehicle with undetected structural defects increases the chance of serious injury.
So a consumer may have taken $1500 in compensation from the
state attorneys general settlement in 2005 only to be seriously
injured or killed in an accident in 2006 caused by structural defects in the vehicle for which a claim against State Farm may
have been feasible but possibly released.
2. Required Releases Rarely Needed in Public Compensation
There often is no compelling need for government enforcers
to enter into required release settlements to ensure that consumers, investors or employees receive relief. Public compensation that offers full relief should prevent certification of a later
class action. In cases where a class action is not feasible for
other reasons, there should be no value for the defendant in the
release other than absolving it of individual claims of substantial amounts, which is a problem with releases the government
enforcer should seek to avoid. And when a class action is feasible but the public action cannot be settled for full relief, the
government enforcer’s discretion among various remedial options makes it unnecessary to bargain away private rights in
the form of a release. It can more aggressively pursue injunctive restrictions and civil penalties, thus leaving compensation
to a private action.
The obvious reason for the government enforcer to enter
this type of settlement is the bargaining leverage provided because the release has value for the enforcement defendant.
Government enforcers can use that leverage in two ways: to obtain better injunctive terms or civil penalties, or to improve the
amount or terms of public compensation. The former presents a
266. Id.; see also Assurance of Discontinuance, In re State Farm Automobile Insurance Company, No. 0532CZ (Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan. 10, 2005).
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direct conflict between public compensation and private rights,
and trading purely public relief for a release of private rights is
hard to justify.
The latter circumstance—when the government enforcer
agrees to a required release as a means of improving the
amount or terms of relief to the group receiving the compensation—raises difficult questions. This situation has consequence
when class feasibility is uncertain, or the government enforcer
determines a class action will not obtain relief as substantial as
would occur through public compensation. The difficulty is that
these decisions result in the release of private claims, so the
government enforcer cannot rely on a coattail class action if the
public compensation is deemed insufficient or if an individual
has an unusual, high-value claim. The next subpart looks at
law reform options for targeted changes to ameliorate concerns
with required release settlements while preserving their use
when consistent with private rights.
3. Limiting Required Release Settlements
This subpart proposes a broad reform and a narrow reform
for required release settlements. The broad reform is to impose
judicial review and public notice with all required release settlements. This reform is aimed at ensuring public compensation is adequate for the relinquishment of rights. The narrow
reform is for government enforcers and courts to carefully review and restrict the scope of releases, which is aimed at preventing individual recipients with high-value claims from suffering unknown or unintended consequences.
Judicial Review and Notice. Some enforcement actions face
267
review by a court; others do not. All required release settlements should be subject to meaningful judicial review because
they present the potential for loss of private rights. Judicial review should be preceded by some form of public notice of the
proposed terms of the settlement and an opportunity to object.
The notice need not be onerous because the likely audience for
the notice is made up of attorneys with an interest in the matter as a possible class action. A posting of proposed settlement
terms at a known website would be sufficient.
These procedural reforms would induce appropriate restraint by government enforcers. Nothing requires a government enforcer to enter required release settlements. Faced with
267. See supra notes 212–13 and accompanying text.

2016]

PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT COMPENSATION

2379

the prospect of public notice followed by judicial review, government enforcers would have a disincentive to use this form of
settlement unless it were essential to the creation of a deal, and
then only if the deal would withstand scrutiny. The degree of
scrutiny likely would be related to the value of the lost private
claims.
Limiting Release Scope. Courts should give especially careful consideration to the scope of releases when reviewing these
settlements. At minimum, required release settlements should
contain limits on the amount or circumstances of the release to
address the problem of individuals with unusual, substantial
claims. Circumstance restrictions could have been effective in
the State Farm case, with a release limited to claims related to
diminished vehicle value as a result of violating title branding
law. The exclusion of claims for personal injury or wrongful
death would have ameliorated the potential for the settlement
to result in the release of claims with extraordinary value for
isolated individuals.
The 2002 settlement between fifty state attorneys general
and Household International provides an example, good and
bad, of an attempt to restrict a release. The settlement included
$484 million in public compensation in the form of cash payments to homeowners who the attorneys general alleged were
deceived by Household in the origination of subprime mortgag268
es. The payments averaged about $1500 per homeowner, but
to obtain that payment the homeowner had to sign a release of
all claims against Household, with one exception—homeowners
could raise otherwise released claims as a defense in foreclo269
sure. The importance of this release exception became apparent when foreclosure rates soared in the years after the settlement. But the settlement did result in the release of powerful
claims other than in foreclosure that were possessed by many
Household borrowers. One particularly important claim was an
action to rescind the loan under the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act, which would allow for the return of up to
270
three years of loan payments to the borrower.

268. Consent Judgment, Washington v. Household Int’l, Inc., No. 02-235630-3, ¶ 4 (Wash. Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 2002).
269. Id. ¶ 32.
270. 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (2012).

2380

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[100:2313

CONCLUSION
Public compensation is poorly understood by scholars, despite the size of recoveries and its increasing prominence. This
Article describes the statutory schemes authorizing public
compensation in different regulatory fields and demonstrates
why the existing law of preclusion appropriately resolves questions about the constitutionality of public compensation as it is
currently practiced. This Article also situates public compensation within the context of its use as a discretionary remedy in
public enforcement so as to dispel the power of the superficially
appealing analogy between public compensation and class actions, and instead focuses discussion of the friction between
public compensation and private rights on two narrow categories of cases where the conflict actually occurs.
Government enforcers and courts can do a better job of
aligning public enforcement with private rights when public
compensation is conditioned on a release of claims and in some
cases where courts consider public compensation as a factor in
class certification. Courts and policy-makers, however, should
give scant notice to scholarship proposing sweeping procedural
reform. The new scholarly critics offer a wholly abstract critique of public compensation that has little connection to how
government enforcers exercise discretion in civil law enforcement. Stripped of its proper context, public compensation appears as a cartoon version of a class action lawsuit that may
deprive recipients of their rights.
This Article is replete with examples of public compensation providing relief for large numbers of consumers, investors,
and employees—often full compensation. To name a few: payments to over-charged payday loan borrowers; refunds to purchasers of medications who paid an inflated price due to antitrust violations; students credited for improper bank fees;
payments to female employees denied promotional opportunities; protecting the contract interests of people who prepaid for
cemetery services; account credits to subprime credit card holders charged for “add-on” services; and even the long-past example of tenants receiving money back from a landlord charging
rent in excess of World War II price limits. Placing new and
unhelpful procedural obstacles in the way of this type of relief
would be a disservice to the people who benefit from public enforcement of laws designed to protect them.

